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A function of threat likelihood, asset resilience and damage
consequences.
Plays an integral role in quantifying security of an asset.

Measure -

Quantifies how much the factor contributes to asset security.

Attribute -

Level of the measure rated on a scale to define the overall
amount that the measure contributes to the factor.

SR Asset -

Security Rating
Specific transportation infrastructure (roadways, bridges,
tunnels, pipeline, airports, guardrails, etc.).

Threat Threat Likelihood -

Any unexpected natural, unintentional man-made or intentional
man-made event that causes damage or disruption.
The probability of a threat occurring that effects the asset.
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Consequence -

The effects of the failure of an asset and its associated costs and
damages.

NBI -

National Bridge Inventory

ESR -

Existing Security Rating

ISR -

Increase in Security Rating

FSR -

Final Security Rating

GIS -

Geographic Information System

ADT -

Average Daily Travel

NOAA -

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

EDMC -

Elemental Decomposition and Multi-criteria

xiii

ABSTRACT
Dojutrek, Michelle Sophie. Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2014. A Stochastic
Multi-Criteria Assessment of Security of Transportation Assets. Major Professor: Dr.
Samuel Labi.
Transportation project evaluation and prioritization use traditional performance
measures including travel time, safety, user costs, economic efficiency, and
environmental quality. The project impacts in terms of enhancing the infrastructure
resilience or mitigating the consequences of infrastructure damage in the event of disaster
occurrence are rarely considered in project evaluation. This dissertation presents a
methodology to address this issue so that in evaluating and prioritizing investments,
infrastructure with low security can receive the attention they deserve. Secondly, the
methodology can be used for evaluating and prioritizing candidate investments dedicated
specifically to security enhancement. In defining security as a function of threat
likelihood, asset resilience and damage consequences, this dissertation uses securityrelated considerations in investment prioritization thus adding further robustness in
traditional evaluations. As this leads to an increase in the number of performance criteria
in the evaluation, the dissertation adopts a multiple-criteria analysis approach. The
methodology quantifies the overall security level for an infrastructure in terms of the
threats it faces, its resilience to damage, and the consequences in the event of the
infrastructure damage. The dissertation demonstrates that it is feasible to develop a
security-related measure that can be used as a performance criterion in the evaluation of

xiv
general transportation projects or projects dedicated specifically towards security
improvement. Through a case study, the dissertation applies the methodology by
measuring the risk (and hence, security) of each for bridge infrastructure in Indiana. The
method was also fuzzified and a Monte Carlo simulation was run to account for unknown
data and uncertainty. On the basis of the multiple types of impacts including risk impacts
such as the increase in security due to each candidate investment, this dissertation shows
how to prioritize security investments across the multiple infrastructure assets using
multiple-criteria analysis.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Importance of Transportation Infrastructure
National transportation systems are vast interconnected networks of diverse
modes and due to its diversity and size; these infrastructure systems play a major role in
the economy and national security of nations (Steffey, 2008). The transportation industry
comprises many modes of travel (air, rail, vehicle, waterway, pipeline) and involves over
nine million jobs that enable a monumental amount of passengers and goods to move
throughout the world annually (Polzin 2012; DHS, 2011; BLS, 2011). Activities in the
transportation sector make up 12% of the gross domestic economy and most businesses
rely on a functioning transportation system to move their products. In the United States,
the marine transportation system, including ports, waterways, and vessels, handles more
than $900 billion in international commerce every year (Lundquist, 2011). Freight
revenue on railroads in 2010 was $56.3 billion (AAR, 2012). Air transportation revenue
in the U.S. totaled $134.7 billion in 2011, 6.8% higher than the previous record set in
2008 (Herbst, 2012).
There are about 600,000 bridges in the overall U.S. network with approximately
1,000 identified as “critical” due to possible casualties, economic disruption, or other
consequences if they are rendered dysfunctional for any reason (AASHTO, 2003). The
losses due to a critical bridge or tunnel could exceed $10 billion. The U.S. transportation
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system includes 337 highway tunnels and 211 transit tunnels, many of which are located
under bodies of water and may have limited alternative routes due to geographic
constraints (AASHTO, 2003). There are 8,606,003 lane-miles of pavement in the United
States (FHWAa, 2014). Railway has a total of 139,118 miles of infrastructure within the
U.S. (FHWA, 2011). Shipping and ports are vital elements in the economic and military
activities of most countries in the world due to their extensive size, open accessibility,
and metropolitan location that ensure a free flow of trade, but present great challenges to
effective monitoring and control of traffic (Steffey, 2008).
The abundance of infrastructure networks has led to their criticality in performing
the functions of everyday life as well as their interconnectedness with other infrastructure
networks, industries, and workforces that rely upon them (Barker et al., 2013). Because
of its diversity and size, a national transportation system is vital to a country’s economy
and national security. Without the transportation industry, thousands of jobs directly or
indirectly connected to this industry, would be lost, and products and goods would not be
mobile within and outside of the country. Malevolent attacks, natural disasters, manmade accidents, or common failures can have significant widespread impacts when they
lead to the failure of network components (Barker et al., 2013). If one part of the system
is impaired, delays and stagnant goods would hinder companies’ profits, cause user
delays, and disrupt everyday life. Intermodal transportation would also be affected if one
mode is unable to complete its part of transporting a good or passengers. Transportation
plays a major role in a country’s economy and therefore should be made as resilient as
possible to failures or damage to enable necessary mobility.
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1.2. Threats to Transportation Infrastructure
Disasters can result in millions and even billions of dollars worth of damage not
only to the physical infrastructure but also in terms of the economic and social
consequences resulting from impaired functionality of the infrastructure. For example,
Hurricane Sandy, which hit the U.S. eastern coast in 2012, caused about $50 billion in
damages, and the 2011 tsunami in Japan caused about $308 billion in damage (Porter,
2013; Ridgwell, 2011). Also, events such as the Paramount Boulevard Bridge accident in
California cost $40 million in damages and repair and the Leo Frigo Memorial Bridge
Pier failure in Wisconsin cost $20 million in investigation and repair costs (Tata, 2012;
Phelps, 2013). The occurrence and magnitude of natural or man-made disasters cannot be
predicted with absolute certainty; however, if civil infrastructure systems can be made to
better withstand the potential damage resulting from these disasters, the consequences
and costs of repair may be reduced.
Similar to all civil infrastructure systems, transportation assets encounter end-oflife situations when they face intended or unintended agents that cause their destruction
(Labi, 2014). Unintended termination can be caused by the failure of the asset itself due
to factors including design flaws, fatigue, advanced deterioration, and other internal
causes; or due to external agents such as overloading, accidents, or natural events.
Intended end-of-life events include deliberate retirement due to structural or functional
obsolescence. Also, transportation infrastructure make attractive targets of intentional
harmful attacks because of their visibility, accessibility, and capacity to carry large
numbers of commuters in a relatively confined space (Steffey, 2008). Maritime and
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surface transportation systems are vulnerable to attacks by terrorists who seek to attract
publicity, and any successful attack can inflict high numbers of civilian casualties and
cause political and economic disruption (Steffey, 2008). Transportation assets are widely
distributed and most routes have multiple entry points and open accessibility which
precludes 100% protection of these assets (Steffey, 2008). This in turn necessitates that a
certain degree of risk of damage or destruction is always attached to these transportation
assets.

1.3. Assessing Risks and Protecting Transportation Infrastructure
Security-related system engineering is defined as the protection of physical
infrastructure components and logical structures and processes from threats and
vulnerabilities (Garcia, 2001). As Polzin (2012) stated, transportation requires security
for numerous reasons including: it is a critical element of the economy; it is a gathering
place for groups of people; it has symbolic and emotional importance; it provides a
delivery means for people and products; it includes institutions with licensing and
enforcement responsibilities. As a National Cooperative Highway Research Program
panel stated, “the source of the threat was only one issue -- the loss of an asset has the
same consequence whatever the cause of the loss” (Cambridge and Parker, 2011).
Security concerns play a large role in how transportation facilities and services are
provided (Polzin, 2012). Malicious individuals regularly attempt to disrupt the operations
of modern transport; worse still, terrorists seek to reap political dividends by attacking
transportation infrastructure and seeking its destruction (Flynn, 2000). The consequences,
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which are numerous, include: casualty impact (the potential for loss or serious injury to
human life); business continuity (the extent to which loss or serious damage to the asset
would impair the ability of the agency to continue to operate); economic impact (the
extent to which loss or serious damage to the asset would affect the viability of business
going forward); replacement cost (the capital investment required to replace the asset);
and replacement downtime (the length of time before the asset can be returned to service)
(Frazier, 2009).
Existing normal methodologies for assessing and managing risks to transportation
infrastructure provide a valuable conceptual structure and practical tools for allocating
resources in cost-effective ways to improve public safety (Steffey, 2008). The U.S.’s
National Infrastructure Protection Plan was updated in 2009 to build a safer, more secure
and resilient country by preventing, deterring, neutralizing, or mitigating the effects of
deliberate efforts by terrorists to destroy, incapacitate or exploit elements of the nation’s
critical infrastructure and key resources (Fisher and Norman, 2010). The Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) pledged to follow a systems-based risk-management
approach that incorporates three main elements: threat, vulnerability (including
criticality), and consequence (Steffey, 2008). Publicly Available Specification 55 Part 2
(PAS 55-2) in the UK states that risk management is fundamental for proactive asset
management and that its purpose is to understand the cause, effect and likelihood of
adverse events occurring in order to manage these risks to an acceptable level (Hooper et
al., 2009). The International Infrastructure Management Manual (IIMM) is a guidance
document focused on the experiences of Australia, New Zealand, UK, South Africa and
the U.S. (INGENIUM, 2006). IIMM recommends that core asset management should
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identify critical assets and events and should apply risk management techniques to these
assets (Hooper et al., 2009). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Enhanced
Critical Infrastructure Protection (ECIP) program has a goal of providing owners and
operators with information to help them make better-informed risk management
decisions; DHS collects data during ECIP visits to support risk reduction investment
parameters and processes, identify gaps that require additional programming, activities
and functions to mitigate, and understand and inform the national risk picture through
detailed analysis (Fisher and Norman, 2010).
There are a few general steps that are required to help reduce unintentional natural
or man-made termination of transportation infrastructure. The first is to measure the
threat likelihood posed by external forces to the asset itself. If the threats are at all
predictable based on historical data such as earthquake occurrence or tendency to flood,
these measurable threat probabilities can help determine if an asset is located in a high
threat area. Second, the threat likelihood can be monitored over time to see if patterns
arise so the asset can be improved to increase its physical resistance or resilience before
the threat strikes. Third, the benefits of any implemented improvements must be assessed
in terms of their effectiveness in reducing the possible consequences in the event of a
threat occurrence. The fourth step involves communicating the gathered information to
serve as evidence for securing the needed funding for security investments. What is
missing from these steps is a way to quantify security to be able to tell which assets are at
the greatest overall risk. As such, a better case could be made to help improve the
security of the transportation infrastructure.
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Uncertainty must be considered when working with security factors. Hazards are
highly non-deterministic. For example, the magnitude of earthquakes or the number of
accidents cannot be predicted at 100% accuracy. The failure to consider uncertainty could
lead to assets being unprepared for the potential range of hazards that could impair the
asset and ultimately, widen consequences to the community and the economy. It is
possible to account for uncertainty using historical data trends and predictive models to
provide a range of likelihood scenarios for hazards that could potentially harm the asset.
In any given jurisdiction, there typically exists a wide range of threat types to
transportation infrastructure; however, if such threats to each asset can be identified, and
if the expected reduction in the asset damage due to security-enhancing investments can
be predicted, the reduction in the disaster consequences can be estimated. When
infrastructure is made resilient through security investments, the consequences of end-oflife events can be reduced and the infrastructure itself can play a role in mitigating or
recovering from the overall damage resulting from the event.

1.4. Problem Statement
At present, the funding allocation processes for transportation infrastructure at
most agencies utilize performance measures that include the expected change in asset
condition or remaining life, economic efficiency, energy use, land use, air quality,
connectivity, and so on (Sinha and Labi, 2007). However, the impacts of competing
investments on asset security are rarely considered in a direct manner. Thus, for assets
that are located in an area of high threat likelihood, their respective candidate investments
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could help reduce the potential for infrastructure damage (and the consequent adverse
impacts on the community). Current evaluation processes do not account for such
beneficial impacts of the investments. As such, it is reasonable to argue that a
performance measure that quantifies the security benefits (reduction of infrastructure
damage risk due to external threats) should be considered in transportation investment
evaluation and also in the prioritization of funds dedicated specifically to security.
Current funding allocation processes for transportation infrastructure rely on key
parameters. For example, asset performance measures (age, condition, etc.), area
performance measures (e.g. air quality), maintenance cycles, and budgets are studied to
determine which specific assets receive funds for asset reconstruction or rehabilitation.
For assets located in high threat areas (e.g., an area with high potential for earthquakes or
landslides), current performance measures would most likely not reflect these situations
and cannot suffice in a comprehensive evaluation of such project evaluations. As such, a
performance measure quantifying security must be considered in the multi-criteria
decision making process as another important key measure for investment prioritization.
This would further align with the goals set by the Homeland Security Transportation
Systems Sector: prevent and deter acts of terrorism against the transportation system;
enhance the all-hazards preparedness and resilience of the global transportation system;
improve the effective use of resources for transportation security; improve sector
situational awareness, understanding, and collaboration (DHS, 2011).
There are five key steps to risk management that should be considered to develop
evidence for security investments: measure the threat likelihood posed by external or
intentional threats to the asset; monitor the threat likelihood over time; assess the
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effectiveness of actions intended to reduce consequences; communicate this information
to the general public and legislators; and provide evidence for appropriate resources. On
the basis of these steps, a methodology should be developed and thereby make it feasible
to consider security as one of the performance measures for general investment
evaluation or to establish a priority list of assets for security investment.
The first step is to measure the threat likelihood posed by forces external to the
asset. If historical data such as earthquake occurrence or flooding tendency are available,
then these threat probabilities can be calculated to identify the areas of high threat
likelihood. The second step states that the threat likelihood can be monitored over time to
identify the optimal time of intervention. The third step states that the effectiveness of
asset improvements can be assessed in terms of the extent to which they can reduce the
damage or other adverse consequences if the threat does occur. The fourth step involves
communicating the gathered information to serve as support material for requesting
funding purposely for investments geared toward securing the infrastructure from
damage. With these steps and a required security metric, a case for improving
transportation infrastructure in terms of security, can be made or strengthened.

1.5. Objectives/Scope
There are four main objectives of this dissertation. The first is to develop a
methodology to quantify security for each asset for all relevant threats to that specific
asset which incorporates the five steps of risk management. The second objective is to
incorporate dynamic concepts into the methodology to capture uncertainty. The third
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objective is to apply the methodology to carry out prioritization of security investments.
The fourth objective is to apply the methodology to investment evaluation on the basis of
multiple criteria. The overall framework can be used for varying kinds of infrastructure
(marine, power, other transportation modes, real estate), however, the case study is
described specifically in the context of highway infrastructure.
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to support strategic resource allocation
decisions at the asset level by providing meaningful measures of security risk that lend
themselves to quantitative benefit-cost analysis (McGill et al., 2007). Since primary
responsibility for management of incidents involving transportation normally rests with
State and local authorities and the private sector, which own and operate the majority of
the nation’s transportation resources (Emergency Support Function #1 Annex Policies
Section-Transportation Annex), this methodology would be useful in deciding which
assets should receive funds to improve their security.

1.6. Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized into eight chapters. Chapter 1 presents the role of
transportation in the economy and provides the rationale for protecting transportation
infrastructure. The chapter also presents the dissertation’s problem statement, objectives,
and scope. Chapter 2 presents a literature review of the current risk assessment
methodologies and discusses the general security variables and how the methods define
the terminology. Chapter 3 describes the proposed security metric that was developed in
this dissertation to address the limitations of traditional methods. Chapters 4 and 5 use the
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developed method to assess security at the asset level and network level. Chapter 6
introduces dynamic concepts into the method developed in the dissertation and provides
case studies. Chapter 7 discusses how to incorporate the security metric into investment
decision making and project evaluation, and Chapter 8 summarizes and concludes the
dissertation and provides directions for future research on this topic.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction
Risk assessment involves the concepts of threat, vulnerability, and consequence
information. Risk management, on the other hand, involves deciding which protective
measures to take based on an agreed upon risk reduction strategy (Moteff, 2005). The
security industry has been slow to use measurable factors in reducing risk because of
difficulties in establishing security-related metrics (SAIC & PB Consult, 2009). Due to
the difficult nature of quantifying key components of threat, vulnerability, and
consequence, transportation security risk analysis generally employ qualitative methods
in making judgments about the magnitudes of various risk situations (Steffey, 2008).
Many in the security industry believe that qualitative analysis is sufficient to address the
protection of lower value assets. Typically, a qualitative assessment assigns relative
values to specific assets based on factors such as the criticality of loss or replacement
costs. The threats against assets are also given a relative value based on their probability
of occurrence. The result is a risk equation that computes risk as both a function of
impact and likelihood of incidence. The goal of a security design strategy should be the
logical and incremental “buy down” of security risk, in order to provide acceptable levels
of protection for transportation agency assets and operations on a continuing basis (SAIC
& PB Consult, 2009).
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2.1.1. Terminology
The terminology used when describing security related factors include the terms
defined in Table 2.1. which are found in the literature.

Table 2.1. Security Terminology

Asset-related
Terms

Threat-related
Terms

Consequencerelated Terms

Term

Definition

Consistent with:

Target

Transportation asset that has
value to the owner or users

SAIC & PB Consult,
2009

Resilience

The ability of the asset to
withstand the threat

Flynn and Burke, 2011

Threat

An unexpected natural,
unintentional man-made or
intentional man-made event
that causes damage or
disruption

SAIC & PB Consult,
2009

Threat
Likelihood

The probability of a threat
effecting the asset

Ayyub et al., 2007

Consequence

The loss of an asset and its
associated costs and damages

SAIC & PB Consult,
2009

2.2. Threat
Threat likelihood is defined as the probability that an external or internal threat
will occur (Labi, 2014). This definition involves the specific threat type and
characteristics of the infrastructure such as location and orientation. Threats to civil
infrastructure are in the form of unintended damage and intended damage, with the added
categories of internal damage and external damage. For example, external unintended
threats could be a sudden event like an earthquake, or a gradual event such as those seen
during a freeze-thaw. Internal unintentional threats may be design flaws or aging of the
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infrastructure itself. Intentional man-made threats take on the form of terrorist attacks and
vandalism, while other man-made threats consist of overloading and collisions. Figure
2.1 below from Labi (2014) describes the different variations threats to civil
infrastructure can take.

Figure 2.1. Possible Threats to Civil Infrastructure
The USDOT and FHWA organized threats to a transportation asset management
program into three groups: asset specific, program specific, and management specific
(FHWA, 2012). Examples of asset specific threats, both internal and external, include:
•

Premature asset failures caused by faulty construction or materials;

•

Chance failures caused by unpredicted events such as barges striking bridges or
truck fires weakening beams;

•

Abrupt failures caused by climatic or seismic events such as flooding, landslides
or seismic activity, or;

•

“Creeping failure” caused by gradual degradation spurred by traffic,
environmental factors, corrosion and climate.
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Program specific threats include:
•

Wear-out failures caused by inadequate maintenance programs;

•

Decision failures caused by inaccurate data or models;

•

Resource failures caused by reductions in appropriations or increases in prices;

•

Operational failures caused by process breakdowns, or;

•

Demand failures caused by unanticipated vehicle loadings.

Management specific threats include those decisions made by agencies or owners of
transportation infrastructure including:
•

The failure to manage physical assets for the long term as official policy;

•

Legislative mandates such as “worst first” that could detract from sound asset
management;

•

Substantial reductions in asset management funding, or;

•

Internal bureaucratic resistance to asset management that can be addressed only
by senior leadership.
Threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential treats on the basis of factors

such as capabilities, intentions, and past occurrences (Steffey, 2008). Quantifying and
assessing risk involves the calculation and comparison of probabilities, but most
expressions involve compound measures that consider both the probability of harm and
its severity (Melnick and Everitt, 2008). ASCE SEI determined that the estimation
probability of failure involves the evaluation of: (i) the probability of the occurrence of a
particular type of hazard or combination; (ii) the maximum intensity of the hazards that
the system is exposed to within its service life; (iii) the probability that the system will
exhibit a particular level of damage/local failure/collapse should the hazard take place.
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Threat likelihood data can be derived from past figures detailing the frequency of
occurrence or simulation of the event using theoretical resources.

2.3. System Resilience
Resilience can be defined as the ability to manage risks and bounce back quickly
from damage (Flynn and Burke, 2011). A study by Barker et al. (2013) focuses on two
dimensions of resilience over time, vulnerability and recoverability, for the development
of a resilience-based component importance measure (CIM) for system analysis.
Resilience can also be defined as a function of infrastructure age, condition, material
type, design type, and other physical characteristics of which help the infrastructure
recover after a disruption by a threat (Labi, 2014). The New Mexico Environmental
Finance Center stated that an asset “may be highly likely to fail if it is old, has a long
history of failure, has a known failure record in other locations, and has a poor condition
rating; and an asset may be much less likely to fail if it is newer, is highly reliable, has
little to no history of failure and has a good to excellent condition rating” (EFC,
2006).The Infrastructure Security Partnership (2011) noted that a resilient infrastructure
sector would “prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond or mitigate any anticipated or
unexpected significant threat or event” and “rapidly recover and reconstitute critical
assets, operations, and services with minimum damage and disruption” (Barker et al.,
2013). The Resilient Systems Working Group (RSWG) of the International Council on
Systems Engineering (INCOSE) was established to enhance systems resilience so that the
recovery from disasters could be enhanced. A working definition for resilience developed
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by the RSWG is as follows: “the capability of a system with specific characteristics
before, during, and after a disruption to absorb the disruption, recover to an acceptable
level of performance, and sustain that level for an acceptable period of time” (INCOSE,
2012). Gunderson and Pritchard (2002) defined engineering resilience as “the speed of
return of the engineering system to the steady state following a perturbation, which
implies a focus on the efficiency of the function”. In general, however, no common
definition or quantitative approach has been adopted for resilience (Henry and RamirezMarquez, 2012).
Resilience for the purposes of this dissertation will incorporate the concept of
vulnerability and its assessment. However, the transportation sector generally does not
build infrastructure for the “maximum of maximums” or extreme cases. For example, the
resources needed to make infrastructure withstand an asteroid collision is not feasible,
therefore the term resilience captures the infrastructure’s ability to withstand threats of
types and intensities that can be reasonably expected, given its location and
characteristics. General steps of vulnerability assessment include: identifying critical
assets to be assessed, assessing vulnerabilities and criticality, assessing consequences,
identifying countermeasures, and estimating the costs of these countermeasures (Venna
and Fricker, 2009). The importance of infrastructure vulnerability analysis has been
accentuated by the increasing realization that greater attention needs to be paid to
infrastructure monitoring in order to prevent unexpected and catastrophic failure since
infrastructure vulnerability is further exacerbated by inadequate condition (Kumar et al.,
2011). The U.S. House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee quantifies about
70,000 bridges as structurally deficient out of the total 600,000 bridges on the National

18
Highway System (USCG, 2010). Patidar et al. (2008) argued that geo-hazard
vulnerability should be duly considered in prioritization processes. If a bridge or other
infrastructure is structurally deficient or functionally obsolete, the vulnerability to geohazards is higher (Kumar et al., 2011).
Informed decisions regarding vulnerability assessment and emergency response
are essential for secure and safe operation of highway assets (Venna and Fricker, 2009).
The National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) for the American
Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) created the Guide
to Highway Vulnerability Assessment for Critical Asset Identification and Protection to
accompany the Guide to Updating Highway Emergency Response Plans for Terrorist
Incidents (SAIC, 2002). The vulnerability assessment methods in the guide are adaptable
to any State DOT, regardless of their critical infrastructure protection plan and help with
assessing the vulnerability of highway transportation assets.
A vulnerability index (protective measures index) was developed by Fisher and
Norman (2010) to compare differing protective measures. A resilience index was also
developed to assess a site’s resilience and consists of three primary components:
robustness, resourcefulness, and recovery. Third, a criticality index that determines the
importance of a facility and includes economic, human, governance, and mass evacuation
impacts was developed. These indices were developed for the Enhanced Critical
Infrastructure Protection initiative that DHS protective security advisers implement
across the nation at critical facilities (Fisher and Norman, 2010).
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2.4. Exposure and Consequences
Consequence is a function of the effect on the community (injuries, lives lost) and
the natural and built-up environment (ecological resources, man-made facilities) if the
infrastructure is damaged due to a threat as well as the infrastructure’s exposure to the
threat (Labi, 2014). Figure 2.2 provides a visual of the effect of consequences to civil
infrastructure on its surrounding environment (Labi et al, 2011). Consequence assessment
involves the nature of the threat and the impact of the loss of the asset (Steffey, 2008).
The consequence associated with an event occurring can be described in multiple ways,
and assessing these consequences can be in the form of the dollar value of resources
damaged or destroyed and cost of repair, replacement, or substitution (Venna and Fricker,
2009). Consequences associated with asset failure may include loss of life and property,
loss of infrastructure needed to support economic activity, military deployment, or the
ability to respond effectively to other emergencies (SAIC, 2002). ASCE SEI determined
that the evaluation of consequence of failure requires the assessment of: i) the cost of
maintenance/ repair/ replacement of the system; ii) user cost and safety; iii) the failure
impact on local and regional economic activity, and; iv) the political ramification to the
affected communities.
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Figure 2.2. Impacts on the Surrounding Environment due to Infrastructure Threats
The New Mexico Environmental Finance Center states: “in terms of the
consequence of failure, it is important to consider all of the possible costs of failure
including: cost of repair, social cost associated with the loss of the asset,
repair/replacement costs related to collateral damage caused by the failure, legal costs
related to additional damage caused by the failure, environmental costs created by the
failure, and any other associated costs or asset losses” (EFC, 2006). Variables to assess
consequences include (Venna and Fricker, 2009):
•

Fatalities/Casualties – Dead and injured as a result of the event.

•

Mission Downtime/Degradation – Time the facility is unable to continue
operation at full capacity or at all.

•

Economic Impact – Direct economic impact on the facility to repair or replace
(not including lawsuits, etc.).

•

Downstream Effects – The extent of the downstream impact on the transportation
system.
“Judgment of the relative importance of assets proceeds on the basis of critical

factors such as casualty risk, potential effects on government continuity and emergency
response, the military importance of the asset, economic impact, and the availability of
alternative resources to perform an asset’s primary function” (Steffey, 2008). Assessing
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criticality requires an examination of the likelihood of failure and the consequence of
failure; the assets that have the greatest likelihood of failure and the greatest
consequences associated with the failure will be the assets that are the most critical (EFC,
2006). The IIMM defines critical assets as those where the consequences of an event
occurring are high, but are not always associated with a high probability of occurrence
(Hooper et al., 2009). Core asset management necessitates the identification of critical
assets. To determine criticality, two pertinent questions must be answered, (i) how likely
the asset is to fail and (ii) what is the consequence if the asset does fail. The data
available to assist in determining whether an asset will fail includes: asset age, condition
assessment, failure history, historical knowledge, experiences with that type of asset in
general, and knowledge regarding how that type of asset is likely to fail (EFC, 2006). The
importance of criticality allows a system to manage its risk, aids in determining where to
spend operation and maintenance dollars, and helps facilitate capital expenditures (EFC,
2006).

2.5. General Assessment of Risk of Infrastructure Damage
Threat, vulnerability, and consequence information are important in risk
assessment while risk management involves deciding which protective measures to take
based on an agreed upon risk reduction strategy (Moteff, 2005). Risk assessment has
been defined as an overall process of risk identification, risk analysis, and risk evaluation
by British Standard 31100 (BSI, 2011). The American Society of Civil Engineers
(ASCE) Structural Engineering Institute (SEI) Technical Council on Life-cycle
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Performance, Safety, Reliability, and Risk of Structural Systems Questionnaire outlines
risk assessment as involving the quantification of risk defined as the product of failure
probability and failure consequence probability for systems subjected to different hazards
or combination of hazards. Risk assessment can be strategic at the network level, tactical
at the asset type/group level or operational at the asset level (Hooper et al., 2009).
ASCE SEI also describes risk management as the decision-making process and
actions taken to preempt and mitigate risk. Due to the difficulties in quantifying key
components of risk assessment, analyses of transportation security risk typically employ
qualitative methods in making judgments about the relative magnitudes of various risk
scenarios (Steffey, 2008). Quantitative risk assessment is an important growing
component of the larger field of risk assessment that includes priority setting and
management of risk (Melnick and Everitt, 2008). Risk information is useful for
emergency managers and first responders when creating evacuation or emergency
response routes. With quantitative risk information, legislative officials would have the
ability to identify areas of concert and allocate resources appropriately.
The Oxford English Dictionary (online) defines risk as “(Exposure to) the
possibility of loss, injury, or other adverse or unwelcome circumstance; a chance or
situation involving such a possibility.” Risk is typically a multidimensional concept
which is often expressed as the Cartesian product in the context of risk analysis for
critical infrastructure (McGill et al., 2008) as shown in Equation 1. The definitions of risk
vary, but in relation to infrastructure asset management, a risk definition should involve
the combination of probability and consequence of any uncertain event (Hooper et al.,
2009).
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Risk = threat•vulnerability•consequence

(1)

Where threat is a set of adverse initiating events, consequence is the spectrum of losses
that can be felt by the victims following their occurrence, and vulnerability is a set of
system of target weaknesses that can be exploited by an adversary to achieve a given
degree of loss.
A threat-based risk analysis approach begins with a predefined set of threat
scenarios based on assumed adversary capabilities justified by intelligence and proceeds
through the analysis of vulnerability and consequence constrained by the definition and
scope of these threats (McGill et al., 2007). This approach is suitable for studying hazards
that are well understood and whose rate of occurrence can be reasonably predicted from
historical data. Asset-driven risk analysis assesses the consequences and probability of
adversary attack for an exhaustive set of plausible threat scenarios without regard to their
probability of occurrence, and then overlays threat likelihood based on the relative
attractiveness of alternative threat scenarios to obtain an estimate of total risk (McGill et
al., 2007). This approach brings all plausible threat scenarios to attention in an attempt to
defeat the potential for surprise attack without regard to adversary intent.
The model described above is the currently accepted model of risk assessment,
but there is room for improvement. The concept of asset resilience should be incorporated
into the security quantification equation as a separate factor focusing on the
characteristics of the asset. Probability of threat would capture the probability of a threat
happening, while the concept of resilience would capture the asset specific
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characteristics. Furthermore, uncertainty should be incorporated into the risk analysis to
capture the range of possible consequences affecting a specific asset.

2.6. Specific Methodologies for Assessing Risk of Infrastructure Damage
At the asset level, strategic and tactical risk assessment is useful to identify
critical assets that require risk assessment. When not all assets require risk assessment in
a larger group of assets, strategic risk assessment is acceptable with tactical risk
assessment where needed (Hooper et al., 2009). In the transportation sector, some of the
commonly used methodologies include: Analytical Risk Methodology (ARM), Maritime
Sector Risk Analysis Methodology (MSRAM), DHS Transit Risk Analysis Methodology
(DHS-TRAM), CARVER, Sandia National Labs Risk Assessment Methodologies
(RAM), and the Homeland Security Comprehensive Assessment Model (HLS-CAM).
The plethora of methodologies has resulted partly from a lack of precision in the
formulation of data collection elements and a less-than-rigorous quality review of process
by the government and security industry; what works in the closed and highly regulated
aviation sector from the standpoint of SVA would not transfer well to the open and
ubiquitous public transit system (SAIC & PB Consult, 2009). A security vulnerability
assessment would be more beneficial if conducted by a trained team of security
professionals using an industry-accepted methodology rather than a self-assessment
questionnaire or checklist.
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2.6.1. National Infrastructure Protection Plan Risk Assessment
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan proposed a methodology to assess the
risk to critical infrastructure defined as assets, systems, and networks deemed vital to the
USA, whose incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security,
economy, public health, or safety (DHS, 2010). The risk assessment methodology has
three main components: vulnerability, resilience, and criticality which help determine
comprehensive, cost-effective, and coordinated programming to manage the resiliencies
and vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure. Risk is defined as a function of threat,
vulnerability, and consequence of the failure of a critical infrastructure facility. In this
case, resilience is included in the consequence factor. The risk is illustrated using a
bowtie representation (Figure 2.3) originally developed to assess chemical processes
which combines events and consequence trees, and allows characterization of pre- and
post-event elements (Philley, 2006). It is used to explain the relationship between
vulnerability, resilience, and criticality.
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Figure 2.3. Risk Bowtie (Philley, 2006)
In this model, vulnerability is the capability of the system to resist a threat which
is directly linked to the protective measures in place and the state of the system when the
threat occurs. Resilience is the capability of the system to avoid or reduce the
consequences set in motion when a threat event is successful and is also linked to the
state of the system. Finally, criticality represents the severity of the consequences to the
facility, the system, and the community. With these definitions, the bowtie scheme
enables the entire spectrum of risk to be represented for a specific facility and/or allows
explanation of the different types of measures that can be used to manage this risk and to
reinforce the system (Fisher and Norman, 2010).
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Consequence Magnitude

Figure 2.4. Risk Matrix (Fisher and Norman, 2010)
The indices used in the methodology can be plotted as seen in Figure 2.4. to help
decision-makers visualize which facilities have the highest relative risk. The vulnerability
index is on the y-axis, the resilience index is on the x-axis, and the criticality index is
represented by a circle (the larger the circle, the greater the consequence). Facilities with
the highest relative risk are identified by high vulnerability, low resilience and high
criticality. Low relative risk is represented by facilities with low vulnerability, high
resilience, and low criticality. The example in Figure 2.4. indicates that facilities 1 and 7
should be brought to the attention of the agency that oversees their security. These
facilities have the lowest resilience, highest vulnerability, and highest criticality.

2.6.2. AASHTO Vulnerability Assessment Method
The AASHTO Vulnerability Assessment method is a guide for agencies to
develop a vulnerability assessment method based on AASHTO’s outlined steps. The
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methodology focuses on subjectively assigning values to factors associated with asset
criticality and vulnerability. Asset criticality and vulnerability scores are transformed into
X and Y coordinates respectively and plotted to determine asset importance. Examples of
criticality factors range from deter/defend factors to consequence to general public
factors (SAIC, 2002). Assets are then prioritized based on the subjective values assigned
to each factor in Table 2.1 using Equation 2 below.
Table 2.2. Critical Asset Scoring (SAIC, 2002)
Critical Asset
Asset 1
Asset 2
Asset 3
Asset n

 

Factor 1

Critical Asset Factor
Factor 2 Factor 3
Factor 4

    = 





Total Score (x)
Factor m

 ∙ 100

(2)

Where x is the total criticality score for asset n; and Cmax is the highest criticality score
attainable.
Vulnerability in the AASHTO vulnerability assessment is broken into three
factors: Visibility and Attendance, Access to the Asset, and Site Specific Hazards (SAIC,
2002). Each factor is broken into two sub-factors and again given subjective values on a
scale of one to five. The sub-factors for each main factor are then multiplied together and
those results are added together as seen in Equation 3 below.


    =  ∙ ! +  ∙ # + $ ∙ 

Where A and B are sub-factors of Factor 1; C and D are sub-factors of Factor 2; and E
and F are sub-factors of Factor 3.
A vulnerability coordinate is derived for each asset using Table 2.2 and Equation 4
below.

(3)
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Table 2.3.Vulnerability Factor Scoring (SAIC, 2002)
Critical Asset
Subjective
Value Range
Asset 1
Asset 2
Asset 3
Asset n



 

(A
1-5

*

B)
1-5

Vulnerability Factor
+ (C
* D) + (E
*
1-5
1-5
1-5

   % = 

&

'

Total Score (y)
F)
1-5

 ∙ 100

(4)

Where Vmax is the highest attainable vulnerability score; and y is the vulnerability total
score for asset n.
The assets are then plotted in the following coordinate system (Figure 2.5) and
assets falling in Quadrant 1 of the graph are the assets of importance.

Figure 2.5. AASHTO Vulnerability Assessment
Consequence assessment is to be assumed from the graph in Figure 1 based on the
X and Y coordinates and their factors and sub-factors. The method goes further by listing
possible countermeasures broken down into countermeasure functions of deter, detect,
and defend to be considered for the assets that fall in quadrant 1. Again, choosing
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countermeasures is a subjective process based on the countermeasure functions and
decision-maker. Finally, the countermeasures listed are given high, medium, and low
rankings based on operational costs to help in the selection process.
A vulnerability assessment for rural transportation networks was assessed by
Nachtmann et al. 2007 who selected AASHTO’s vulnerability guide as the most robust
vulnerability assessment tool. An alternative vulnerability assessment was also developed
that included the Analytic Hierarchy Process to provide importance rankings within
AASHTO’s framework as a modification. The AASHTO methodology for risk
management is quite subjective and uses surveys to obtain data (Venna and Fricker,
2009). Additionally, vulnerability and criticality are the only major factors included in the
method to determine asset security importance, while concepts such as resilience are not
(Dojutrek et al, 2014). Further, the method defines vulnerability and criticality as separate
entities, but the concepts are quite similar. If an asset is vulnerable, then it has high
criticality and vice versa.

2.6.3. TMSARM Vulnerability Self Assessment Tool
The TMSARM Vulnerability Self Assessment Tool developed by the
Transportation Security Agency (TSA) is a self-assessment tool that guides a user
through a series of security-related questions to develop a comprehensive security
baseline of a transportation asset and assists users in the development of a comprehensive
security plan. The user is then prompted to assess the baseline security system
effectiveness in response to specific threat scenarios. The effectiveness is then reassessed
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based upon the addition of countermeasures in response to conditions of heightened
threat. The method was originally developed for maritime vulnerability and risk
assessment for the U.S. Coast Guard’s regulatory efforts promulgated the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 (Coast Guard, 2003). A requirement of the
MTSA is that any facility or vessel that may be involved in a transportation security
incident should conduct a vulnerability assessment and submit a security plan to the U.S.
Coast Guard. The MTSA defines a transportation security incident as “a security incident
that results in a significant loss of life, environmental damage, transportation system
disruption, or economic disruption in a particular area” (Federal Register, 2002). The tool
is available to company security officers, vessel security officers, and facility security
officers. This tool has restricted access and is available only to certain companies and
agencies (Venna and Fricker, 2009).

2.6.4. CARVER+Shock Vulnerability Assessment Tool
The CARVER method was originally developed as an offensive target analysis
tool that was used by the Army Special Forces for mission planning based on a
commander’s objectives (Clark and Philpott, 2011). The method allowed the U.S.
military to identify areas within critical or military infrastructure that are vulnerable to an
attack. CARVER identifies six vulnerability factors (FDA, 2009):
•

Criticality - measure of public health and economic impacts of an attack

•

Accessibility - ability to physically access and egress from target

•

Recuperability - ability of system to recover from an attack
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•

Vulnerability - ease of accomplishing attack

•

Effect - amount of direct loss from an attack as measured by loss in production

•

Recognizability - ease of identifying target
The factors are subjectively assigned a value on the scale of 0 to 10 (NIICIE,

2007). The overall vulnerability score of a single target is the sum of the scores assigned
to the seven criteria and can be compared to rank the vulnerability of the different targets
relative to each other. The targets with the highest total rating have the highest potential
vulnerability and should be considered for countermeasures (FDA, 2009). It accounts for
target components of the target system and is applicable to features outside of
transportation. This method was the standard security vulnerability assessment tool for
many years before it was further developed into the CARVER+Shock method. The
CARVER+Shock method added an additional factor of “Shock” to the factors. Shock
incorporates the combined health, economic, and psychological impacts of an attack on
the target system (FDA, 2009). Psychological impact is influenced by a large number of
deaths if the target has historical, cultural, religious, or other symbolic significance and if
victims are members of a sensitive subpopulation such as children (FDA, 2009).
Federal agencies, such as the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) and the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), have utilized the CARVER+Shock method to
evaluate the potential vulnerabilities of farm-to-table supply chains of various food items.
This method is useful when assessing the potential vulnerabilities of individual
processing facilities (FDA, 2009). This methodology is popular as local governments
seek to leverage simple analysis tools to derive security-related information. It provides a
“quick and dirty” means to rank potential targets based on vulnerability. However,
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McGill and Ayyub (2007) pointed out that its additive and inherently non-probabilistic
nature does not produce results that can support security risk assessment.

2.6.5. Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model
The Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) is a risk analysis tool
employed by the U.S. Coast Guard. Similar to other methods, MSRAM assesses risk in
terms of threat, vulnerability, and consequences. As a tool, MSRAM enables Federal
Maritime Security Coordinators and Area Maritime Security Committees to perform
detailed scenario risk assessments on all maritime critical infrastructure (DHSa, 2010).
The model is used to inform strategic and tactical risk decision-making. The
methodology is designed to capture the security risk facing various targets and assets that
span multiple sectors. MSRAM is a scenario-based tool that evaluates threat,
vulnerability, and consequences and considers mitigating options. This method facilitates
operational planning and resource allocation, prioritization of sector assets, and a riskbased evaluation of port security grant proposals. Expanding the capabilities of MSRAM
is an ongoing priority for the maritime mode (DHSa, 2010).

2.6.6. TCM Risk Assessment Method
The TMC Risk Assessment Methodology (TCM RAM) is a combination from
three different sources, the Systematic Assessment of Facility Risk (SAFR), a separate
methodology developed by the DHS Office of Domestic Preparedness toolkit, and ideas
from AASHTO's Guide (SAIC, 2005). The steps in this method include: asset
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identification, threat assessment, consequence assessment, vulnerability assessment, and
countermeasure development. It evaluates risk using the following equation:
(( = ) ∙ ) ∙  ∙ 1 − +# ∙ 1 − +,

(5)

Where RR (Relative Risk ) is a function of the overall threat to the asset or facility, T; the
attractiveness of a particular target to a given adversary, TA; the potential consequences
of a successful attack on a target, C; the ability to deter an adversary from attempting an
attack, LD (expressed in terms of the inability to deter, or 1-LD); and the effectiveness of
the system to prevent an attack should one be attempted, LS (expressed in terms of
system ineffectiveness, or 1-LS).
Calculating the relative risk to one asset has limited value since it only indicates
the risk to that asset relative to the highest and lowest possible RR (Venna and Fricker,
2009). The TMC RAM is a theoretically good model, but requires a lot of expert effort to
quantify the value of subjective criteria which could input inconsistency and variance into
the model. This method evaluates vulnerability and criticality in terms of relative risk and
target attractiveness (Venna and Fricker, 2009).

2.6.7. CAPTA
The Costing Asset Protection for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA) method
identifies security-related countermeasures for assets on the basis of the extent of
potential losses (SAIC & PB Consult, 2009). CAPTA uses a consequence-based
methodology that supports capital budgeting and resource allocation. The method
establishes a consequence threshold for planning and resource allocation purposes rather
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than focusing on assets, specific hazards, or threats, simplifying the risk management
process. The main purpose of the method is to reduce risks to a level manageable by
operating agencies based on their available budget and resources. Consequence
thresholds are established subjectively for the risk factors that include the potentiallyexposed population, property loss, and mission disruption. This method is mainly a
decision-informing tool for capital budgeting, not necessarily an asset specific assessment
tool for prioritizing assets (SAIC & PB Consult, 2009). It also focuses attention on
significant, relevant assets, but eliminates those assets or asset classes whose loss of use
would not exceed consequence thresholds, regardless of the hazard or threat from further
consideration (SAIC & PB Consult, 2009).

2.6.8. Critical Asset and Portfolio Risk Analysis (CAPRA)
The critical asset and portfolio risk analysis (CAPRA) method was developed to
consider both natural and human-caused hazards (Ayyub et al., 2007). The formula
resembles a traditional model based on the notional product of consequence,
vulnerability, and threat. The framework is as follows:
Scenario IdentificationConsequence & Criticality AssessmentSecurity Vulnerability
Assessment Hazard Likelihood Assessment Benefit/Cost Analysis Risk Informed
Decisions
Consequence and criticality assessment estimates the losses associated with each
hazard scenario as a function of intensity. Equation 6 illustrates the consequence and
criticality portion of CAPRA:
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+ = -|/ ∙ 01 − $1,- 3 ∙ +1,/ ∙ 1 − $4 

(6)

Where Lx is the loss as a function of hazard intensity attributed to hazard scenario x; F|h
is the fragility of the target element  due to hazard type h as a function of hazard
intensity; EM measures the resistance of the asset’s mission to loss as a function of
element damage; LMC,h is the maximum credible loss associated with hazard h; and ER
measures the effectiveness of response and recovery capabilities.
Vulnerability is taken as the probability of adversary success as a function of
hazard intensity for a specific attack profile as seen in Equation 7:
56,& = 01 − $6,& 3 ∙ 57 ∙ 8

(7)

Where PS,y is the probability of adversary success as a function of hazard intensity for a
specified attach profile y; ES,y is the security system effectiveness with respect to the
characteristics of attack profile y; PK is the probability that the adversary will successfully
execute its attack on the target given failure of the security system; and Q is the
probability distribution for hazard intensity imparted on the target (PS = Q for natural
hazards).
Hazard likelihood was defined as the product of the estimated annual rate of
occurrence for a given hazard type, and for deliberate human-caused hazard. Equation 8
below outlines the relationships.
9& =

:,& 6, ;,/ 9<,/

(8)

Where λy is the annual rate of occurrence associated with a given attack profile y; AP,y is
the relative attractiveness of attack profile y; AS,x is the relative attractiveness of hazard
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scenario x, AA,h is the relative attractiveness of the asset with respect to hazard type h; and
λ0,h is a baseline annual rate of occurrence.
The risk assessment portion is the combination of rate of attack, probability of
adversary success given attack, and the loss given adversary success:
A

(& = =< >-|? 01 − $1,- 3+1,/ 1 − $4 01 − $6,& 3 ∙ 8

:,& 6, ;,/∙ 9<,/ @

B

(9)

Where Ry is the annual risk associated with an attack profile y, hazard scenario x, and
hazard type h; LMC,h is the maximum credible loss; λ0,h is the baseline annual rate of
hazard occurrence.
(/ = +1,/ / 9;,/

(10)

Where Rh is the total hazard risk across all hazard scenarios and profiles for a given
hazard type; λA,h = AA,hλ0,h is the annual rate of occurrence for a given hazard affecting
the asset; and Vh is the overall vulnerability as:
/ = ∑FHI
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Where the summations are taken over all hazard scenarios Xh and corresponding attack
profiles Yx for a given hazard type h. Vulnerability can be interpreted as the degree of
maximum credible loss following a hazard event that captures both the inherent physical
and security weaknesses associated with different system statistics of an asset and its key
elements (Ayyub et al., 2007).

2.6.9. Risk Filtering, Ranking, and Management Method
The Risk Filtering, Ranking, and Management (RFRM) method builds on
hierarchical holographic modeling (Haimes et al., 2002) to identify risks then filters and
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ranks the many sources of risks, enabling decision-makers to focus on the most critical.
Hierarchical holographic modeling (HHM) is a comprehensive framework for identifying
real and perceived sources of risk (Leung et al., 2004). Prioritized risks are evaluated in
the risk management phase of this method and later reviewed in order to make future
improvements to the system (Leung et al., 2004). The phases of the method are listed
below and most rely on interview or survey techniques to gain the necessary data to run
each scenario.
•

Phase 1: Scenario identification through hierarchical holographic modeling

•

Phase 2: Scenario filtering based on scope, temporal domain, and level of decision
making

•

Phase 3: Bi-criteria filtering and ranking

•

Phase 4: Multicriteria evaluation

•

Phase 5: Quantitative ranking

•

Phase 6: Risk management

•

Phase 7: Safeguarding against missing critical items

2.6.10. Summary of Assessment Methods
The methods described above mainly rely on the traditional risk equation which
includes the threat, vulnerability, and consequence factors. Each method defines the
terms in slightly different words and uses various measures to determine the levels of
each. For example, AASHTO uses criticality and vulnerability as separate variables, but
it could be argued that vulnerability is a function of criticality. Additionally, many of the
methods described above rely heavily on the use of subjective data and complex data
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collection to perform their analysis. Further, most methods did not look specifically at
asset physical characteristics (e.g., age, material, design type). It is important to realize
that the physical infrastructure can play a role in decreasing consequences by
withstanding threats acting upon it. Finally, the methods described do not consider
dynamic features throughout their frameworks and rarely mention capturing uncertainty.

2.7. Incorporating Analytical Techniques into Risk Assessment
A study done by Xia et al. (2004) developed a framework for risk assessment that
includes static and dynamic infrastructure characteristics in the event of a terrorist attack.
The risk score of a highway component is defined as a linear combination of three
indices:
( = ∝



+ K! ∙ L<<

(12)

Where R is the risk score of highway network component; A is the static characteristic
index; B is the dynamic characteristic index; C is the attack potential index; α is the
weight of the static characteristic index; and β is the weight of the dynamic characteristic
index.
The static characteristics (Index A) include: structural stability, number of
alternatives, and response resources of highway components. The dynamic characteristics
(Index B) include: dynamic traffic flow information such as volume, speed, occupancy,
vehicle classification, and queue length as well as weather details and work zone
activities. The potential of a terrorism attempt (Index C) is estimated in terms of
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functional significance and symbolic importance of a highway component (Xia et al,
2004).
The score of Index A is calculated as:
= M;L + M;N + M;O + M;P

(13)

The score of Index B is calculated as:
! = MQL + RMQN + SMQO + ℎMQP + MQU

(14)

The score of Index C is calculated as:
 = VML + WMN

(15)

Where W’s are the weights predetermined with the help of experts; and a, b, c, d, e, f, g,
h, i, j, k are characteristics pertaining to each index.
The Blue Ribbon Panel Approach to risk management first prioritizes bridge
assets then completes a risk assessment (AASHTO, 2003). The risk assessment calculates
risk as follows:
( =X∙∙Y

(16)

Where R is the risk to the facility; O is the occurrence or likelihood that terrorists will
attack the asset (includes target attractiveness, level of security, access to the site,
publicity if attacked, and the number of prior threats); V is the vulnerability or likely
damage resulting from various terrorist threats (includes expected damage, outcome of
the event, expected casualties, and loss of use, all features of the facility itself); and I is
the importance or indication of consequences to the region or nation if the facility is
destroyed.
The formula for R expresses the interaction among the three factors, where
dominant factors magnify risk, while negligible factors diminish it (AASHTO, 2003).
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Different formulas fail to account for their interactive effects, such as models that add
factors (Venna and Fricker, 2009).
A method developed by Ray (2007) focuses on a single bridge asset and the risk
associated with each of its many individual structural components. Within this study, risk
is described as the relative potential for a terrorist attack against a specific component of
the asset and the associated consequence from the attack. Factors used in the risk analysis
include the component’s importance to overall structural stability, location and
accessibility to terrorists, and resistance to a specific threat. Results include a rankordered list of the components most at risk to an attack, which allows prioritization and
optimization of the mitigation design for the bridge asset. The risk equation for a single
bridge, for each of its j components exposed to threat i, is as follows:
( = ∑DYZ ∑>X[Z [Z @E

(17)

Where j is the individual bridge component; i is the threat; Oij is the measure of the
probability of a threat i occurring against component j; Vij is the vulnerability of
component j given the occurrence of threat i; and Ij is the importance of an individual
component j to the bridge.
Each factor is further broken down into weights and attribute factors which sum
to a number between zero and one.
YZ = ∑\]R^ ^ _,(

(18)

X[Z = ∑\]R^ ^ _

(19)

[Z = ∑\]R^ ^ _

(20)

Where wfk is the weighting factor applied to the attribute ak; ak is the attribute or specific
unity-based criteria of varied importance that sum together to define each factor; SR is the
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span ratio for the bridge (ratio of the span length of the part component j is attached and
the main bridge span).

2.7.1. Fuzzy Logic and Risk
Fuzzy logic was used in a study by McGill and Ayyub (2007) to approximate the
true functional relationship between the effectiveness of six security system capabilities
(access control, personnel barriers, vehicle barriers, surveillance systems, guard force,
and reaction force with heavy weapons) and probability of adversary success. The goal of
the model is to provide a system based on approximate reasoning that produces an
estimate for the probability of adversary success based on the subjective evaluation of
several or more defensive criteria. Pr(S|Ai) is the probability of adversary success (S)
given the occurrence of initiation event Ai and the complementary event Pr(,̅|Ai) as the
security system effectiveness (McGill and Ayyub, 2008). Each defensive criterion (six
security system capabilities) can take on a linguistic value of “Low,” “Medium,” or
“High” defined on a constructed scale for effectiveness with membership functions. The
Consequent Pr(S|A) may take on linguistic values such as “Likely,” “Certain,” or “Even
Chance.” There is the possibility that each defensive criterion may require its own set of
linguistic phrases for effectiveness, for example if one criterion was based on a
constructed scale and another on a crisp scale such as time (McGill and Ayyub, 2008). A
user (security expert) can subjectively assign a value to each premise of criterion on a
scale of 0-10 or an alternate scale for a given facility of asset and attack type once the
fuzzy inference rules are defined.
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Another study by Yazdani et al., (2012) uses Fuzzy TOPSIS as a fuzzy multicriteria decision making technique to determine the weights of each criterion and the
importance of alternatives with respect to criteria for risk analysis. This framework
extends the Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP)
method by introducing new parameters (“detectability” and “reaction against event”) to
assess the effects on risk value. “Detectability” is the potential and capability for
identification and elimination of the weakness, and “reaction against event” is the
capability of an appropriate response in order to reduce or limit the effect of an event
after it happens or to prevent against the development of casualties, damage, and/or loss
(Yazdani et al, 2012). The TOPSIS method helps decision-makers carry out analysis and
comparisons in ranking their preference of the alternatives with vague or imprecise data
(Yazdani et al., 2012). It is based on the concept that the chosen alternative should have
the shortest distance from the positive-ideal solution and the longest distance from the
negative-ideal solution (Secme et al., 2009; Gummus, 2009; Sun, 2010; Yue, 2011).
A study by Yang et al. (2009) uses a fuzzy evidential reasoning (ER) method to
conduct maritime security assessments. Within this method, a subjective security-based
assessment and management framework using fuzzy ER approaches was developed. The
consequence parameter is a security parameter which can be derived from multiple risk
parameters: will, damage capability, recovery difficulty, and damage probability. Here,
will is the likelihood of a threat-based risk, which directly represents the lengths one goes
through in taking a certain action. To estimate will, one may choose to use such linguistic
terms such as “Very weak,” “Weak,” “Average,” “Strong,” and “Very strong.” The
combination of damage capability and recovery difficulty represents the consequence
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severity of the threat-based risk. Specifically, damage capability indicates the destructive
force/execution of a certain action, and recovery difficulty hints at the resilience of the
system after the occurrence of a failure or disaster (Yang et al., 2009). The following
linguistic terms can be considered as a reference to be used in subjectively describing the
two sister parameters: “Negligible,” “Moderate,” “Critical,” and “Catastrophic” for
damage capability and “Easy,” “Average,” “Difficult,” and “Extremely Difficult” for
recovery difficulty. In this case, damage probability means the probability of the
occurrence of consequences and can be defined as the probability that damage
consequences happen given the occurrence of the event. One may choose to use such
linguistic terms as “Unlikely,” “Average,” “Likely,” and “Definite” to describe it (Yang
et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2007).

2.7.2. Summary of Fuzzy Logic Methods
Xia et al, (2004) developed a methodology to address the dynamic nature of
specific infrastructure aspects without including uncertainty. The method developed by
McGill and Ayyub (2008) outlined a fuzzy approach to assess the effectiveness of
security system capabilities from the terrorist perspective but did not look specifically at
infrastructure characteristics or the natural threat perspective. Yazdani et al, (2012) added
two new criteria, “detectability” and “reaction against event”, into the traditional risk
equation and input the new criteria into a fuzzy framework. Yang et al, (2009) further
developed the variables used in the traditional risk equation to include new parameters
based on terrorist attack for maritime transport and input these into a fuzzy evidential
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reasoning framework. This method does not break down the variables into infrastructure
specific subcategories.

2.8. Risk Considerations in Project Evaluation and Programming
Multi-criteria decision making uses any of several alternative methods including
cost effectiveness, economic efficiency, the factor rating method, and the analytic
hierarchy process. Economic efficiency can be calculated using the net present value,
present worth of costs, or the benefit cost ratio. The factor rating method ranks different
criteria based on subjective weighting. The analytic hierarchy process uses matrix
multiplication of criteria weights to each alternative weight to derive the best option. The
basic steps for conducting multi-criteria optimization are shown in Figure 2.6.
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Figure 2.6. Steps for Conducting Multi-Criteria Optimization (Sinha and Labi, 2007).
Cellucci (2010) developed a method to prioritize proposed programs and projects
for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The method uses a Program Prioritization
Index (PPI), a simple metric to evaluate the value gained from pursuing certain proposed
programs relative to others. It is a value-based model that captures the relative utility of
one program over another by incorporating a utilitarian approach to provide the most
“good” for the most people and property, while recognizing both political sensitivity and
risk and cost-saving factors. The first factor incorporates the people protected from
potential threat (typical occurrence). Points for this factor are assigned to the following
number of people potentially protected: assign zero for zero people; one for 1-10 people;
two for 11-100; three for 101-500 people; four for 501-1000 people; and five for 1001100,000 people and an additional point for each 20,000 people potentially protected. The
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second factor incorporates property protected from potential threat. The points for this
factor are assigned to every $50M of property protected and the positive political impact
generated (societal perception) as a result of a program/project’s implementation. Zero
points are assigned for “low”; five points for “medium”; and ten points for “high.” The
third factor incorporates the cost savings realized by DHS upon full implementation of
the program where one point is assigned for each $1,000,000 saved (includes personnel
plus resources). Finally, the last factor incorporates dollars requested/spent by DHS on
the program/project where one point is assigned for each $1,000,000.

The PPI calculation is:
55Y =

;aQaab
c

(21)

Where A is the people protected points; B is the property protected points; C is the
societal perception points; D is the cost savings points; and E is the dollars
requested/spent.
The higher the PPI value, the more value it potentially returns for a given DHS
investment. For a risk-adjusted PPI, the PPI is multiplied by the “probability of success”
of the program/project (e.g., obtain all stated objective(s)/specification(s)) expressed in a
fraction ranging from 0% probability of success (0.0) to 100% probability (1.0). For
example, 0.5 would relate to a 50% probability of success.
McGill et al. (2007) used the benefit-cost ratio technique to assess the cost
effectiveness of proposed countermeasures and consequence mitigation strategies. In this
case, the benefit of a risk mitigation action is the difference between the values of loss,
conditional risk, or total annual risk before and after its implementation.
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In planning for infrastructure security, many uncertainties arise pertaining to
threat likelihood. Not planning for this uncertainty could lead to less-than-optimal
decision-making. An inaccurate prediction of threat likelihood raises the risk of failure
for infrastructure, therefore increasing the potential consequences. Uncertainty in
accounting for security of infrastructure may also result in biased selections of alternative
improvements and errant project prioritization. By making risk-informed decisions,
stakeholders can more accurately compare levels of confidence against costs (Ford,
2011).

2.9. Gaps in the Literature
All methodologies employ varying definitions for key terms while incorporating
differing factors in a myriad of combinations. Many factors, such as vulnerability and
criticality, are so similar that they should not be considered separately. Additionally,
many key factors, such as resilience, are missing from the risk assessment methodologies
in the literature. Without strong definitions and key factors, making a case to fund
security enhancements for transportation infrastructure based on current methods will be
difficult.
As stated in a previous section, risk is a multidimensional concept which is often
expressed as the Cartesian product in the context of risk analysis for critical infrastructure
(McGill et al., 2008). The formula for risk expresses the interaction among the three
factors of threat likelihood, vulnerability, and consequence, where dominant factors
magnify risk and negligible factors diminish it (AASHTO, 2003). Different formulas,
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such as models that add factors, fail to account for the factor interaction effects (Venna
and Fricker, 2009).

2.10. Chapter Summary
This chapter provided a literature review of current risk assessment steps and
methodologies. First, risk assessment was defined and the terms associated in quantifying
risk were detailed. The different classifications of threat type were described and threat
likelihood was characterized as the probability that an external or internal threat will
occur. Resilience was outlined as a function of vulnerability and consequence as well.
Various methods in the literature were analyzed for their robustness, and gaps were
identified for future improvement. The next chapter illustrates the dissertation’s
framework for filling the gaps found in the literature review.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction
As discussed in Section 2.8., traditional transportation infrastructure project
evaluation uses a variety of performance measures that are related to the transportation
asset, its operations, and its environment but does not consider directly possible reduction
in the infrastructure damage and the resulting consequences in the event of a disaster.
During the prioritization of investments, assets of low security do not receive the due
attention they deserve. By incorporating the threat likelihoods, asset resilience, and
disaster consequences, this chapter is based on the premise that the inclusion of these
considerations in evaluation and prioritization introduces a much needed element of
robustness in such tasks. However, the inclusion of security as a performance measure
leads to an increase in the number of performance measures for the investment
evaluation. Also, there is some uncertainty or variability associated with the threat
occurrence, asset resilience, and disaster consequences. For these two reasons
respectively, the framework presented in this chapter incorporates elements of multiple
criteria decision making and fuzzy logic. This chapter presents a methodology to quantify
the overall security level for an asset in terms of the threats it faces, its resilience to
damage from such threats, and the consequences of the infrastructure damage if the threat
occurs. The overall framework consists of the traditional steps in risk management and
the specific contribution is in the part of the framework that measures the risk.
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3.2. Proposed Definition of Security
For this dissertation, security can be defined as a function of threat likelihood,
asset resilience and damage consequences. The security of a transportation asset is the
lack of risk of damage from threats due to inherent structural or functional resilience.

3.3. Framework
The proposed security rating developed in this dissertation has three main inputs
which are integral to risk assessment: threat likelihood, asset resilience, and disaster
consequence. The output, security rating index, can be used to help in prioritizing assets
for optimal security enhancement funding and for use in multi-criteria project evaluation
(Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1. Proposed Methodology Framework
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The definitions of the key inputs and terminology used in this dissertation are defined in
Table 3.1.
Table 3.1. Terminology for Proposed Framework
Term

Definition

Asset

Specific transportation infrastructure

Resilience

The ability of the asset to withstand and recover from
the threat

Threat
Likelihood

The probability of a threat occurring that effects the
asset

Consequence

The effects of the failure of an asset and its associated
costs and damages

Factor

Plays an integral role in quantifying security of an asset

Measure

Quantifies how much the factor contributes to asset
security

Attribute

Level of the measure rated on a scale to define the
overall amount that the measure contributes to the factor

3.4. Security Factors
Each of the three main security factors (threat likelihood, asset resilience, and
damage consequences) has measures that quantify how much each factor contributes to
the overall security of an asset. Each measure is further decomposed into attributes that
indicate the level of the measure rated on a scale to define the overall amount that the
measure contributes to the security factor. Since the attributes of each measure have
different units, the attribute data was scaled to account for these differences.
Additionally, each measure is weighted for importance; therefore, a decision-maker can
determine which measure plays a larger role in each specific security factor.
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Each security factor is calculated as follows:
d = ]L ∙ eL + ⋯ + ]g ∙ eg
f = 1….3
n = 1…n

(22)

Where Ff is a security factor; wn is the weight/importance of measure n; and Mn is a
measure of security factor Ff.
Each measure for a security factor follows the formulation below. Attributes that
comprise a security measure are multiplied together and divided by the total number of
attributes associated with a specific measure.
eg =

∏kjlm ij
nk

(23)

Where Mn is a measure of security factor Ff; si is an attribute that contributes to the level
of measure Mn, rated on a scale to define the overall amount that measure n contributes to
the risk factor, Ff; and Ns is the number of attributes associated with measure n.
The detailed framework can be visualized in Figure 3.2. Each factor is shown
with specific measures and each measure has associated attributes for the purpose of this
dissertation.
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f=3

M=n

s=s

Figure 3.2. Detailed Framework

3.4.1. Methodology for Assessing Threat Likelihood
Threats to an asset can be categorized into three main groups: natural, man-made
unintentional, and man-made intentional. Each of these groups contains many different
threats to transportation assets as listed in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2. Examples of Threats to Transportation Infrastructure
Natural

Man-made
Unintentional
Accidents
Chemical Spills
Collisions
Overload

Examples

Tornado
Hurricane
Earthquake
Landslide
Tsunami
Volcano
Flood
Ice
Lightning
Sinkholes

Data/models for
occurrence
prediction

Historical Data

Historical Data

Man-made Intentional
Arson
Terrorism
Vandalism

Predictive models
Literature

The measures associated with the threat likelihood factor in this study are the ease
of access to the asset and location-specific hazards, such as earthquakes or floods. The
following equation gives weights to each measure associated with the threat likelihood
factor for an overall effect of threat likelihood on the security of an asset.
Lopq = ]L ∙ eL + ⋯ + ]g ∙ eg

(24)

Where FTL is the threat likelihood factor; w1, wn are the weight/importance for each threat
likelihood measure; and M1, Mn are measures of threat likelihood.
The measures are further broken down into attributes. The following equation
relates the attributes that contribute to the factor measure.
eg =

∏kjlm ij
nk

(25)

Where Mnis a measure for threat likelihood; si are the scaled attributes for measure n; and
Nattribute is the total number of attributes for measure n.
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Each attribute is then scaled between one and five to account for different units of
measure of each attribute for the purpose of the case study. These scales can be further
refined by representative utility functions or value functions for each attribute. For
example, the attributes could be scaled as shown Table 3.3., where a rating of five
indicates a low level of contribution to the associated factor and one indicates a high level
of contribution to the associated factor.
Table 3.3. Example Attribute Scale
Sample Attribute Levels

Scale

<50%

1

51%-74%

2

75%-84%

3

85%-94%

4

95%+

5

3.4.2. Resilience
Resilience is the ability of an asset to maintain essential functions with little or no
disruption and to recover quickly when/if disrupted. The measures associated with the
resilience factor in this study are how resistant the asset is to threats, the asset’s ability to
recover from a threat, and the asset characteristics. The following equation gives weights
to each measure associated with the resilience factor for an overall effect of resilience on
the security of an asset.
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No4 = ]L ∙ eL + ⋯ + ]g ∙ eg

(26)

Where FR is the resilience factor; w1, wn are the weight/importance for each resilience
measure; and M1, Mn are measures of resilience.
The measures are further broken down into attributes. The resistance measure has
two attributes, asset condition and asset age. Asset condition is defined as the physical
asset condition of asset components. Asset age is defined as the age of the asset in year t.
The following equation relates the attributes that contribute to the resistance measure.
eg =

∏kjlm ij

(27)

nk

Where Mn is a measure for the resilience factor; si are the scaled attributes for measure n;
and Nattribute is the total number of attributes for measure n.
Each attribute is then scaled between one and five to account for different units of
measure. In terms of resilience, a rating of five would indicate a high level of
contribution to resilience and one would indicate a low level of contribution to resilience,
opposite of the threat likelihood and consequence attribute scales.

3.4.3. Consequence
Consequence is the outcome of a threat towards a specific asset in terms of the
damage to its surroundings. The following equation gives weights to each measure
associated with the consequence factor for an overall effect of consequence on the
security of an asset.
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Oo = ]L ∙ eL + ⋯ + ]g ∙ eg

(28)

Where FC is the consequence factor; w1, wn are the weight/importance for each
consequence measure; and M1, Mn are measures of consequence.
The measures are further broken down into their attributes. The following
equation relates the attributes that contribute to a measure of consequence.
eg =

∏kjlm ij

(29)

nk

Where Mn is a measure for the consequence factor; si are the scaled attributes for measure
n; and Nattribute is the total number of attributes for measure n.
Each attribute is then scaled between one and five to account for different units of
measure. A rating of five indicates a low level of contribution to the consequence factor
and one indicates a high level of contribution to the consequence factor.

3.5. Security Rating
The security rating equation can take any one of several forms. Also, there are
several ways by which the constituent factors could be weighted. For example, addition,
subtraction, multiplication, a ratio, or some combination of the above: (i) ,( = pq +
 − 4 ; (ii) ,( = pq ∙  − 4 ; (iii) ,( = pq ∙  ∙ 4 ; (iv) ,( =

rst ∙ru
rv

; (v) ,( =

]L pq +   − ]N 4 ; (vi) ,( = pq ∝ ∙  w − 4 x . Where SR is the security ratio; FTL is
the threat likelihood factor; FC is the consequence factor; FR is the resilience factor; and
w1, w2, α, β, λ are factor weights. For purposes of this study, the security rating equation
is shown below.
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rvz

{ ar| 
rst
u


(30)

SRa = security rating for asset a
FTLa = threat likelihood factor of asset a
FCa = consequence factor of asset a
FRa = resilience factor of asset a
α = exponential weight of the resilience factor
δ = exponential weight of the threat likelihood factor
λ = exponential weight of the consequence factor
This form was chosen due to its ability to be understandably interpreted. The
security factor of resilience, which has a positive connotation in terms of security, is
divided by the security factors of consequence and threat likelihood, which have negative
connotations in terms of security. An asset with high resilience would presumably be able
to withstand a potential hazard therefore increasing its security level. An asset with large
potential consequences and large threat likelihood would be associated with a lower
security level. By formulating the equation in this arrangement, the larger the resilience
and the smaller the consequences and threat likelihood, the greater the ratio. This would
imply a high security rating. For example, if asset resilience increases due to
improvements, threat likelihood is predicted to be low, and consequences decrease due to
people moving away from the surrounding area, the security rating would increase.
Therefore, the greater the security rating, the more secure the asset is. Each factor can be
graphed against each other to identify assets of importance for security improvements to
agencies or stakeholders as shown in the following three figures.
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Figure 3.3. Threat Likelihood-Resilience Nomograph
In Figure 3.3., asset A has a high threat likelihood, indicating that a threat is
imminent in the near future, and low resilience which would indicate the asset is not
prepared for the oncoming threat. For example, if an asset was located in an area with a
propensity for landslides and had not been brought up to code recently, the asset has a
higher chance of failure. This asset would be of high importance to agencies and
stakeholders when determining the prioritization for security improvements.
Alternatively, Asset C has low threat likelihood and high resilience, making this asset
prepared for any low probability threat that may occur. Agencies could give this asset
lower priority for security improvements. Asset B and C could be given a medium
priority for improvements since they have a mixture of good and bad qualities. Asset B
has a low probability of threat occurring but is also not very resilient. In the case that a
threat did occur, the asset would not be prepared to withstand it. Asset D has a high
probability of threat and high resilience, therefore the asset is prepared for the threat, but
it is located in a dangerous area.

61

Figure 3.4. Consequence-Resilience Nomograph
In Figure 3.4., asset G has a low consequence level and high resilience indicating
that if a threat did occur, the asset would be able to withstand it and there would be
minimal consequences. This asset would be given less priority than asset E. Asset E has a
high consequence level and low resilience level. Therefore, if a threat occurred, the asset
would not be able to withstand it; and its failure would lead to high consequences. For
example, a bridge that has not been maintained properly, is designed poorly, and is
located near residences with a high volume of traffic could cause great damage if it
failed. Agencies or stakeholders would need to focus on improving this asset in order to
make it more resilient to the threat and therefore reduce the potential consequences.
Assets F and H have a mixture of good and bad factors that play a role in their security.
Asset F has a low resilience level and low consequence level indicating that the asset
could potentially fail if a threat occurred but would not cause much damage in terms of
consequences. Asset H has a high level of consequences but counters it with a high level
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of resilience. This asset has the ability to withstand a threat and would therefore prevent
consequences.

Figure 3.5. Threat Likelihood-Consequence Nomograph
In Figure 3.5., asset L has a high probability of threat occurring and high
consequences should the asset fail. This asset should be given priority for security
improvements to make sure it is very resilient in order to withstand the impending threats
and lowering resulting consequences. Asset J has a low probability of threat occurring
and low consequences, meaning it can be given a lower priority than other assets such as
I and K which have more cause for improvements. Asset I has a high probability of threat
occurrence but a low consequence level. This indicates that should a threat happen and
the asset fails, the consequences would be minimal. For example, this asset may be
located in a desert where no one resides. This means that consequences would not be
high. Finally, asset K has a low probability of threat occurring but a high consequence
level. If this asset failed, consequences would be devastating; but since threats are
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minimal, it would have a low probability of failing and therefore could be placed in a
medium priority level.
Additionally, a three-dimensional representation can be derived from these three
factors to better show their interactions (Figure 3.6.). An asset with high threat likelihood,
high consequences, and low resilience (the black square) would require agencies to focus
on this asset in order to make sure it is more resilient, reducing the consequences of
impending threats. Assets with high resilience, low consequences, and low threat
likelihood (the off-white square) are of lesser priority for security improvements than
those with low threat likelihood, low consequence, and low resilience (the gray square).

Figure 3.6. Three Dimension Representation of Security Rating Factors
The security rating can be placed on a scale and interpretations made as seen in
the below figure and table below.

Figure 3.7. Security Rating Scale
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Table 3.4. Interpretation of Security Rating
Security
Rating
≤β

β-δ

δ-ζ

ζ-θ

θ-λ

λ-µ

Interpretation
Indicates very high security improvement needs and low resilience thus immediate
action should be undertaken to enhance resilience and thus reduce the possible
consequences.
Indicates high security improvement needs of the asset. The agency should be ready to
undertake actions to enhance resilience and thus to reduce the possible consequences of
the asset failing.
Indicates medium-to-high security improvement needs. Facilities within this range can
be monitored at a frequency slightly exceeding standard frequency. The risk of failure
can be tolerated until a normal capital project (to enhance resilience and thus reduce
consequences, among other benefits) is carried out.
Indicates low-to-medium security improvement needs. Unexpected failure can be
avoided during the remaining service life of the asset by performing standard scheduled
inspections with due attention to specific design features that influence the assets
possible consequences.
Indicates low security improvement need. Often reflective of the likelihood of threat to a
civil engineering system built to the current design standards in a low threat likelihood
environment.
Indicates little or no security improvement needs.

3.5.1. Expert Opinion
Expert opinion can be defined as the formal judgment of experts on a matter in
which their advice is sought; an opinion could mean a judgment of a belief that is based
on uncertain information or knowledge (Ayyub, 2001). Opinions are subjective
assessments, evaluations, impressions, or estimations of the quality or quantity of
something of interest that seems true, valid, or probable in the expert’s view. The first
structured methods for expert opinion elicitation were done by the Research and
Development Corporation (RAND) (Ayyub, 2001). Elicitation methods include: the
indirect elicitation, direct method, and parametric estimation. Multiple methods are
available to synthesize expert opinion: the Delphi Method, scenario analysis, scientific
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heuristics, and rational consensus being among them. In some cases, expert opinion in the
form of subjective probabilities of an event need to be combined into a single value or
intervals for their use in probabilistic and risk analyses (Ayyub, 2001). To successfully
combine the opinions of different experts there are two main methodologies:
mathematical and consensus. Mathematical methods, specifically, are based on assigning
equal or different weights to expert opinion (Clemen, 1989; Ferrell, 1985), while
consensus methods rely on mutual agreement.
Expert opinion can be used to build frequency or probability distributions when
data is unavailable (Ford, 2011). In order to accomplish this goal, the following
methodologies can be used: the Extended Pearson Turkey Method, Four Point Bracket
Method, reference lotteries, and/or paired comparisons of situations (Clemen and Reilly,
2001). When working with expert opinion, caution should be taken to remove expert
opinion biases in the estimations. Within this framework, experts were consulted to help
determine measures for specific factors, scales for security attributes, and fuzzy logic
membership function ranges.

3.6. Chapter Summary
This chapter presented a methodology to quantify the overall security level for an
asset in terms of threat likelihood, asset resilience, and the consequences in the event of
system damage due to threat occurrence. This methodology addresses the risk
measurement aspect of the traditional risk management framework. The next chapter uses
this methodology in an asset-level case study.
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CHAPTER 4: ASSET LEVEL CASE STUDY

4.1. Introduction
Asset-level analysis is important to maintain and increase the security of
transportation networks. Infrastructure should be analyzed at the asset-level due to the
differences between asset types, location specific characteristics, and physical
characteristics. Each asset provides a different combination of measures and attributes
which should be closely analyzed to gain information on an asset’s security. For example,
an asset that is located in an area with propensity to earthquakes and near a large
population would have a different security rating than an asset in an area with low
earthquake occurrence and a location in the middle of a desert. Due to the range of
combinations for each asset, an asset-level analysis must be completed to identify assets
in need of security improvements.
Bridge #8868, the JFK Bridge in Jeffersonville, Indiana, was chosen as a sample
case study to demonstrate how the security rating function works with associated
measures, attributes, and attribute scales (Figure 4.1).
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Figure 4.1. JFK Bridge, Structure No. 8868, Clark County, Jeffersonville, IN

4.2. Data and Assumptions
Data was taken from the National Bridge Inventory (NBI) database for the state of
Indiana for Bridge No. 8868. Assumptions were made to carry out the case study. The
construction time was based on the bridge size. Earthquakes were identified as the threat
for the example and the probability of earthquake threat was equal to the amount of
historical earthquake epicenters found in the county the asset resides in. Environmental
barriers were assumed to be waterways under a bridge and physical barriers were
assumed to be roadways under the bridge. The detour travel speed was assumed to be
45mph and all weights in the security rating equation (α, δ, λ) were assumed to be equal.

4.3. Factor Analysis

4.3.1. Threat Likelihood Factor Computation for the JFK Bridge Case Study
The measures associated with the threat likelihood factor in this case study are the
ease of access to the asset and location-specific hazards, which include earthquakes or
floods. The access-to-asset measure plays a role in an asset’s security and is pertinent
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when considering terrorist attacks. Some infrastructure hold iconic status to a country or
group. This symbolic infrastructure could therefore be targeted by terrorists for the
devastating impact of losing such a meaningful structure. The location-specific data,
which focuses on location of an asset and what hazards are typical in that area, will be
different depending on where each asset is situated. The following equation gives weights
to each measure associated with the threat likelihood factor for an overall effect of threat
likelihood on the security of an asset.
pq = ]y}}~iiyii~ ∙ ey}}~iiyii~ + ]}y[g ∙ e}y[g

(31)

Where FTL is the threat likelihood; waccess-to-asset is the weight/importance for access
measure; Maccess-to-asset is the access to asset measure; wlocation is the weight/importance of
the asset location; Mlocation is the location specific hazards measure.
The measures are further broken down into attributes. The access-to-asset
measure has two attributes: environmental barriers and physical barriers. Environmental
barriers are natural barriers that keep the public and vehicles away from an asset; physical
barriers are man-made barriers that keep the public and vehicles away from an asset. The
following equation relates the attributes that contribute to the access-to-asset measure.
ey}}~iiyii~ =

i j ∙iIkj
njk

(32)

Where Maccess-to-asset is the access-to-asset measure; senvironmental is the environmental
barrier scaled attribute; sphysical is the physical barrier scaled attribute; and Nattribute is the
number of attributes for the access to asset measure.
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The access-to-asset attributes are scaled as shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1. Attribute Scales for Access-to-Asset
Environmental
Barriers

Scale

Physical Barriers

Scale

None

5

None

5

One

3

One

3

2+

1

2+

1

The location-specific hazards measure could have the following attributes: natural
hazards, freeze index, and precipitation. Natural hazards are defined as location-specific
hazards such as earthquakes or hurricanes. The freeze index is the cumulative number of
degree-days when air temperatures are below and above zero degrees Celsius in the area
around the asset. Precipitation is measured in 100th inches of rainfall at the asset location.
The following equation relates the attributes that contribute to the location-specific
hazards measure.
e}y[g =

i ∙i ∙ijjj
njk

(33)

Where Mlocation is the location-specific hazards measure; snatural is the natural hazard
scaled attribute; sfreeze is the county freeze index scaled attribute; sprecipitation is the county
precipitation scaled attribute; and Nattribute is the number of attributes for the location
specific hazards measure.
The location specific hazard attributes are scaled as shown in Table 4.2 based on
expert opinion.
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Table 4.2. Attribute Scales for Location-Specific Hazard
Natural Hazard
Probability
(% chance of hazard)

Scale

<50%

1

<115

1

<37

1

51%-74%

2

115-263

2

37-39

2

75%-84%

3

263-462

3

39-42.4

3

85%-94%

4

462-661

4

42.4-45

4

95%+

5

661+

5

45+

5

Freeze Index

Scale

Precipitation Scale
th

(100 inches)

Threat likelihood data for the JFK Bridge are shown in Table 4.3. The threat
likelihood factor equates to 2.67 using the equations (34-36) for the measures shown
below.
Table 4.3. JFK Bridge Threat Likelihood Factor Data
Measure
Access to
Asset
Location
Specific
Hazards

Scaled
Attributes

Measure
Results

Over river

3

4.5

Physical Barriers

Roadway underneath

3

Natural Hazards

Earthquake epicenter

1

County Freeze Index

30

1

County Precipitation

45.84

5

Attributes

Data

Env Barriers

ey}}~iiyii~ =
e}y[g =

i j ∙iIkj
njk

i ∙i ∙ijjj
njk

=

=

O∙O
N

L∙L∙U
O

1.67

= 4.5

(34)

= 1.67

(35)

pq = ]y}}~iiyii~ ∙ ey}}~iiyii~ + ]}y[g ∙ e}y[g = 0.5 ∙ 4.5 + 0.5 ∙ 1.67 = 2.67

(36)
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4.3.2. Resilience Factor Computation for the JFK Bridge Case Study
The measures associated with the resilience of an asset are: the asset resistance to
hazards, asset recoverability after damage, and the asset’s physical characteristics. An
asset’s ability to resist and recover from a hazard gives an indication as to how long
repairs will take, and therefore, how much it will cost to fix. Asset physical
characteristics will also play a role in predicting how well an asset can withstand a
hazard. For example, an older asset may not be up to current building codes and therefore
not structurally advanced to withstand an earthquake or flood. The following equation
gives weights to each measure associated with the resilience factor for an overall effect of
resilience on the security of an asset.
4 = ]~i[iyg}~ ∙ e~i[iyg}~ + ]~}~y[[& ∙ e~}~y[[& + ]}/yy}~[i[}i ∙
e}/yy}~[i[}i
(37)
Where FR is the resilience factor; wresistance is the weight/importance of asset resistance;
Mresistance is the measure of asset resistance; wrecoverability is the importance/weight of asset
recoverability; and Mrecoverability is the measure of asset recoverability; wcharacteristics is the
weight/importance of asset characteristics; and Mcharacteristics is the asset characteristic
measure.
The measures are further broken down into attributes. The resistance measure has
two attributes: asset condition and asset age. Asset condition is defined as the physical
asset condition of asset components. Asset age is defined as the age of the asset in year t.
The following equation relates the attributes that contribute to the resistance measure.
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e~i[iyg}~ =

ijj ∙i
j

njk

i = 1….I

(38)

Where Mresistance is the measure of asset resistance; sconditioni is the condition scaled
attribute for i asset components; saget is the scaled attribute for asset age in year t; and
Nattribute is the number of attributes for the resistance measure.
The resistance attributes are scaled as shown in Table 4.4. In this case, the scaled
rating of five implies a greater contribution to resilience as opposed to the attributes
associated with the threat likelihood and consequence factors.
Table 4.4. Scaled Attributes for the Resistance Measure
Condition
(0-9)
7-9
6
5
3-4
1-3

Scale

Age (years)

Scale

5
4
3
2
1

<5
5-10
10-19
19-70
70+

5
4
3
2
1

The bridge rating scale used in the NBI database is shown in Table 4.5. A
histogram of bridge ages in Indiana is shown in Figure 4.2. These data and expert opinion
were used to determine the attribute scales.
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Table 4.5. National Bridge Inventory Rating Scale
Rating

Description

9
8
7
6
5

Excellent Condition
Very Good Condition-no problems noted
Good Condition-some minor problems
Satisfactory Condition-structural elements show minor deterioration
Fair Condition-all primary structural elements are sound but may have minor corrosion,
cracking or chipping. May include minor erosion on bridge piers.
4
Poor Condition - advanced corrosion, deterioration, cracking or chipping. Also
significant erosion of concrete bridge piers.
3
Serious Condition - corrosion, deterioration, cracking and chipping, or erosion of
concrete bridge piers have seriously affected deck, superstructure, or substructure. Local
failures are possible.
2
Critical Condition - advanced deterioration of deck, superstructure, or substructure. May
have cracks in steel or concrete, or erosion may have removed substructure support. It
may be necessary to close the bridge until corrective action is taken.
1
"Imminent" Failure Condition - major deterioration or corrosion in deck, superstructure,
or substructure, or obvious vertical or horizontal movement affecting structure stability.
Bridge is closed to traffic but corrective action may put back in light service.
0
Failed Condition - out of service - beyond corrective action
N
Not applicable
Source: Federal Highway Administration, National Bridge Inventory
Bridge Age
Normal, Mean=25.91, StDev=16.48
0.025

Density

0.020

0.015

0.010
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0.000

-20
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20
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Age (years)

Figure 4.2. Probability Distribution of Indiana Bridge Age
The recoverability measure has three attributes: construction time, construction
cost, and asset size. Asset time is defined as the amount of time needed to reconstruct the
asset in case of total failure. Construction cost is the amount of dollars needed to
construct the asset. Asset size is the area the asset takes up (ft2, lane-miles). These
attributes play a role in how quickly an asset can recover from hazard damage. For
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example, the greater the size of an asset, the more it will cost for materials and repairs
and the longer it may take to fix. The following equation relates the attributes that
contribute to the recoverability measure.
e~}~y[[& =

ij ∙ikj ∙ik

(39)

njk

Where Mrecoverability is the measure of asset recoverability; stime is the time is takes to
reconstruct the asset; ssize is the size of the asset; scost is the construction cost of the asset;
and Nattribute is the number of attributes for the recoverability measure.
The recoverability attributes are scaled as shown in Table 4.6. Histograms of
construction cost and size for Indiana bridges are seen in Figures 4.3. and 4.5. This data
and expert opinion determined the recoverability attribute scales for this case study.
Table 4.6. Recoverability Measure Scaled Attributes
Construction
Time (yrs)
<0.3
0.4-0.9
1-2
2.1-5
5.1+

2

Scale

Construction Cost

Scale

Asset Size (ft )

Scale

5
4
3
2
1

<$1.98M
$1.98M-$4.57M
$4.57M-$9.83M
$9.83M-$21.8M
$21.8M+

5
4
3
2
1

<11,440
11,440-31,747
31,748-78,373
78,373-235,914
235,914+

5
4
3
2
1
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Construction Cost
Normal, Mean=1.94508e+006, StDev=3.06777e+006
0.00000014
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Figure 4.3. Probability Distribution of Indiana Bridge Network Construction Cost
Bridge Area
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Figure 4.4. Probability Distribution of Indiana Bridge Network Size

The asset characteristic measure has two attributes: asset material and asset design
type. Asset material is the dominant type of material the asset is constructed from. Asset
design type is the design type of the asset. The following equation relates to the attributes
that contribute to the asset characteristic measure.
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e}/yy}~[i[}i =

ij ∙ikj
njk

(40)

Where Mcharacteristics is the measure for asset characteristics; smaterial is the scaled attribute
for asset material; sdesign is the scaled asset design type; and Nattributes is the number of
attributes for the asset characteristic measure.
The asset attribute scales for the characteristics measure are shown below. Asset
characteristics are important for determining if an asset is resilient based on its physical
characteristics. For example, a concrete or steel bridge may be able to withstand more fire
damage than a timber bridge. Concrete, steel, and timber represent over 98% of the
materials used for bridge construction in the United States (Smith et al, 1997). In a study
by Smith et al. (1997), bridge materials were rated using expert opinion and the analytical
hierarchy process. State department of transportation engineers, private consulting
engineers, and local highway officials from Mississippi, Virginia, Washington, and
Wisconsin were interviewed for their expert opinion. In each state, a group of four to
twelve individuals were interviewed. The results showed that based on the factors of:
performance measures of material lifespan, past performance, maintenance requirements,
resistance to natural deterioration, initial cost, and lifecycle cost, that prestressed concrete
was the material of choice followed by reinforced concrete, steel, and timber (Smith et al,
1997). This study was used to determine the scale for the bridge material attribute (Table
4.7.). Bridge types also possess positive and negative aspects of their design. It is very
important to select the most appropriate bridge type for a site to account for costeffectiveness and area characteristics (USDOT, 2012). Table 4.8. below lists some
examples of strengths and weaknesses for many bridge types.
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Table 4.7. Asset Characteristic Measure Scaled Attributes
Material
Prestressed Concrete
Reinforced Concrete
Steel
Other
Wood

Scale
5
4
3
2
1

Design Type
Slab
Box Beam
Stringer, Girder
Truss
Cable-stayed, Arch,
Suspension

Scale
5
4
3
2
1

Table 4.8. Bridge Design Type Strengths and Limitations
Bridge Type
Beams

•

Girders

•
•
•
•

Trusses

•
•
•

Cable-stayed

•
•

Suspension

•
•

Arch

•
•
•
•

Strengths
Unit cost of rolled beams low due to
simple fabrication
Details less expensive
Economical in short span ranges
Multi-girder composite construction
accounts for deck strength
Deck girders offer flexibility of
roadway width
Used when unrestricted vertical
clearance below bridge
Economical substructures
Easy to widen

Edge girders carry bending between
stay cable anchorages plus axial
Compressive forces additive from end
longest cables toward towers

Rely on high-strength cables as major
structural elements
Towers significantly shorter than those
required for cable-stayed
Economical for very long spans
Used to cross deep valley with steep
walls
High performance steel used to reduce
fractures
Redundancy reduces fracture critical
status

Source: USDOT (2012)

Limitations
• Higher unit weights due to
rolled beams

• Welding led to cracks
• Fracture critical
• Through girder system limited
to superstructure depth
restriction
• Fracture critical
• Widening limited to structural
capacity
• Not cost-effective for span
under 450 feet
• Labor intensive
• Edge girder design not
controlled by bending but by
compressive forces imparted
by stay cables, requiring
heavier section to avoid
buckling
• Not economical until main
span length exceeds 3,000 feet
• Require large expensive steel
castings
• Specialized erection process
• Foundation costs increase for
deep foundations
• Tied arches are fracture
critical
• Not economical after 900 feet
length
• Fracture critical
• Complex to erect
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The resilience measures, attributes, and scales for the JFK Bridge can be seen in
Table 4.9. Equations (41-44) used the data to compute each measure value and input for
the resilience factor equation. The resilience factor equates to 9.13.

Table 4.9. JFK Bridge Resilience Factor Data
Measure

Attributes

Resistance

Condition

Recoverability

Asset
Characteristics

e~i[iyg}~ =

4

Superstructure: 5

3

Substructure: 6

4

Age

83 yrs

2

Const. Time

2yrs

2

Const. Cost

$45.2M

1

Asset Size

267,466 ft2

1

Material

Continuous steel

3

Design Type

Truss Bridge

2

njk

e~}~y[[& =

Scaled

Deck: 6

ijj ∙i
j

Data

=

ij ∙ikj ∙ik

P∙O∙P∙N
P

24

0.66

3

= 24

N∙L∙L

(41)

= 0.66

(42)

=3

(43)

4 = ]~i[iyg}~ ∙ e~i[iyg}~ + ]~}~y[[& ∙ e~}~y[[& + ]}/yy}~[i[}i ∙ e}/yy}~[i[}i
= 0.33 ∙ 24 + 0.33 ∙ 0.66 + 0.33 ∙ 3 = 9.13

(44)

e}/yy}~[i[}i =

njk

=

Results

ij ∙ikj
njk

=

O

O∙N
N

4.3.3. Consequence Factor Computation for the JFK Bridge Case Study
The measures associated with the consequences of bridge failure due to a hazard
are: the potentially exposed population around the asset, the property lost due to the
bridge failure, and the effects of mission disruption due to a closed bridge. For example,
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people that live near the bridge may rely on the bridge to allow them to travel across a
river, and if the bridge is closed, they may need to travel out of their way to cross the
river on another bridge. Consequences could also arise from the bridge collapsing while
people are traveling over it and could ruin anything under or near the bridge from falling
debris. Additionally, the loss of a bridge will detract from an agency’s total infrastructure
value and lead to repair costs. The following equation gives weights to each measure
associated with the consequence factor for an overall effect of consequence on the
security of an asset.
 = ]y[g ∙ ey[g + ]~& ∙ e~& + ]

[i[g

∙e

[i[g

(45)

Where FC is the consequence factor; wpopulation is the potentially exposed population
importance; Mpopulation is the potentially exposed population measure; wproperty is the
property loss importance; Mproperty is the property loss measure; wdisruption is the mission
disruption importance; and Mdisruption is the measure of mission disruption.
The measures are further broken down into their attributes. The potentially
exposed population measure has two attributes: population around the asset and average
daily traffic (ADT). The population around the asset is defined as the number of people in
the area surrounding an asset. The following equation relates to the attributes that
contribute to the potentially exposed population measure.
ey[g =

ij ∙i¡¢s
njk

Where Mpopulation is the potentially exposed population measure; spopulation is the scaled
population around the asset attribute; sADT is the average daily traffic on the asset; and
Nattributes the number of attributes for the potentially exposed population measure.

(46)

80
The potentially exposed population attributes are scaled as shown in Table 4.10.
The county population where the asset is located was used as the potentially exposed
population for the case study.
Table 4.10. Potentially Exposed Population Measure Scaled Attributes
ADT
<6,920
6,921-17,950
17,951-36,710
36,711-79,520
79,921+

Scale
1
2
3
4
5

County Population
<38,075
38,076-84,964
84,965-182,791
182,792-484,564
484,565+

Scale
1
2
3
4
5

The property loss measure has two attributes: replacement cost and value. The
replacement cost is the total cost to replace the asset. Value is the worth of the asset to
stakeholders. The following equation relates the attributes that contribute to the property
loss measure.
e~& =

ik ∙i 
njk

(47)

Where Mproperty is the property loss measure; srcost is the scaled replacement cost attribute;
svalue is the scaled asset value attribute; and Nattributes is the number of attributes for the
property loss measure.
The scaled property loss attributes are shown in Table 4.11. Both replacement
cost and value attributes were grouped based expert opinion and INDOT data
distributions.
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Table 4.11. Property Loss Measure Scaled Attributes
Replacement Cost
<$11,000
$10,001-$1.49M
$1.5M
$1.5M-$119M
$120M+

Scale
1
2
3
4
5

Value (EDMC)
<$2.06M
$2.06M-5.5M
$5.51M-$12.8M
$12.81M-$38M
$38M+

Scale
1
2
3
4
5

The mission disruption measure also has two attributes: detour length and travel
time increase due to detour. The detour length is measured by the miles driven to travel
around the asset to continue to a destination. Travel time increase due to the detour is the
increase in travel time due to traveling around the failed asset. Time has no intrinsic
value, but in terms of time saved due to arriving at a destination early, value is given to
the ability to perform other tasks during this additional time (Sinha and Labi, 2007). In
this case, saved travel time would provide a benefit to drivers while increased travel
times would cost them time and energy. Therefore, mission disruption identifies increase
in travel time due to a detour a consequence of impassable infrastructure. The following
equation relates to the attributes that contribute to the mission disruption measure.
e

[i[g

i

= n

∙i

jk

(48)

Where Mdisruption is the mission disruption measure; sdetour is the scaled detour length
attribute; stt is the scaled travel time increase due to the detour attribute; and Nattribute is the
number of attributes for the mission disruption measure.
The mission disruption attributes are scaled in Table 4.12.
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Table 4.12. Mission Disruption Measure Scaled Attributes
Detour Length
(miles)
<2
3
6
8
10+

Scale

Travel Time Inc.
(min)
<3
3-5
5-8
8-10
10+

1
2
3
4
5

Scale
1
2
3
4
5

The data for the JFK Bridge consequence factor can be seen in Table 4.13. The
consequence factor equates to 4.29 using equations (49-52).
Table 4.13. JFK Bridge Consequence Factor Data
Measure

Attributes

Data

Potentially
Exposed
Population

Population

Jeffersonville: 27,362
Clark County: 96,472

AADT

15,200

2

Property
Loss

Replacement Cost

$36.1M

4

EDMC Value

$18.63M

4

Mission
Disruption

Detour Length (miles)

3.11

2

Inc in travel time due
to detour

4.15 min

2

ey[g =
e~& =
e

[i[g

ij ∙i¡¡¢s
njk

ik ∙i 
njk
i

= n

∙i

jk

=

O∙N
N

Scaled
3

=3

Results
3

8

2

(49)

=

P∙P

=8

(50)

=

N∙N

=2

(51)

N

N

 = ]y[g ∙ ey[g + ]~& ∙ e~& + ]
= 0.33 ∙ 3 + 0.33 ∙ 8 + 0.33 ∙ 2 = 4.29

[i[g

∙e

[i[g

(52)

The individual security factors for the JFK Bridge are graphed for further analysis
and lie in the medium (gray) to high (dark gray) importance ranges as delineated by the
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average factor levels of all the bridges in Indiana shown as the borders between colors
(Figure 4.5.).

(a)JFK Bridge Threat Likelihood-Resilience Nomograph
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(b) JFK Bridge Consequence-Resilience Nomograph

(c) JFK Bridge Threat Likelihood-Consequence Nomograph
Figure 4.5. Security Factor Levels of JFK Bridge
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4.4. Security Rating
Based on the security factor outputs for the JFK Bridge using the given data, a
security rating can be calculated in Equation 53 below. The overall security rating for the
JFK Bridge is 1.31, a security rating of high importance as seen on the scale in Figure
4.5. A security rating of high importance indicates that unexpected failure can be avoided
if an agency takes immediate action to enhance the resilience of the bridge and thus
reduce the possible consequences. The JFK Bridge would therefore need improvements
to increase its security rating and should be monitored to improve its secure standing.
¥.LOm

,(¤r7 = N.¦§m

aP.N¥m 

= 1.31

Figure 4.6. Security Rating Scale

(53)
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Table 4.14. Interpretation of Security Rating
Security
Rating
≤1.67

1.673.33
3.335.00

5.006.68

6.688.35
8.35-10

Example Interpretation
Indicates very high security improvement needs and low resilience thus immediate
action should be undertaken to enhance resilience and thus reduce the possible
consequences.
Indicates high security improvement needs of the asset. The agency should be ready to
undertake actions to enhance resilience and thus to reduce the possible consequences of
the asset failing.
Indicates medium-to-high security improvement needs. Facilities within this range can
be monitored at a frequency slightly exceeding standard frequency. The risk of failure
can be tolerated until a normal capital project (to enhance resilience and thus reduce
consequences, among other benefits) is carried out.
Indicates low-to-medium security improvement needs. Unexpected failure can be
avoided during the remaining service life of the asset by performing standard scheduled
inspections with due attention to specific design features that influence the assets
possible consequences.
Indicates low security improvement need. Often reflective of the likelihood of threat to a
civil engineering system built to the current design standards in a low threat likelihood
environment.
Indicates little or no security improvement needs.

4.5. Chapter Summary

This chapter presented an asset-level methodology to quantify the overall security
rating for the JFK Bridge, in terms of the: threat likelihood, system resilience, and
consequences in the event of system destruction or damage due to earthquake occurrence.
The methodology addresses the risk measurement aspect of the traditional risk
management framework. The next chapter applies the methodology to the Indiana bridge
network to demonstrate how network-level security analysis will help decision-makers
prioritize assets for risk management
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CHAPTER 5: NETWORK LEVEL CASE STUDY

5.1. Introduction
This chapter applies the methodology developed in this dissertation to a
transportation network. The Indiana state bridge network was used for the network-level
case study along with earthquake threat information. The methodology is applied to each
individual bridge to ascertain the security trends of the system. This analysis will help
identify areas of security concern based on the three relevant security factors and spatial
analysis of bridge security ratings. The security ratings of specific groups of bridges will
determine if certain bridge characteristics play a significant role in asset security.

5.2. Data
The data compiled to demonstrate the methodology was from the Federal
Highway Administration National Bridge Inventory (NBI) for the state of Indiana. The
data collected for highway bridges included; the year of construction, total deck width,
bridge length, superstructure material type, design type, condition, county location,
average daily travel (ADT), roadways or waterways under a bridge, and detour length.
Additional data included the number of earthquake epicenters in a county, county
population data, county precipitation, county freeze index, construction cost, construction
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time, replacement cost and asset value. Data for each specific security factor are listed in
Table 5.1.
Table 5.1. Data Needs, Security Factors for Security Rating
Factors
Threat Likelihood

Resilience

Consequences

Data Needs
Natural Hazards
Freeze Index
Precipitation
Environmental Barriers (waterways)
Physical Barriers (roadways, railroad)
Condition
Age
Construction Time
Construction Cost
Asset Size
Material
Design Type
Population
ADT
Replacement Cost
Value
Detour Length
Travel Time Increase from Detour

The data for natural hazards (earthquake epicenters) and county populations in
Indiana was located in the IndianaMAP geographic information system (GIS) map
database (IGS, 2014). Freeze index and precipitation data for Indiana was located in the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) database. Bridge
replacement costs, values and construction costs were used from a study done on asset
valuation in the state of Indiana (Dojutrek et al., 2012). The Elemental Decomposition
and Multi-criteria (EDMC) valuation method was utilized to find the values of all bridges
in the state of Indiana (Dojutrek et al., 2014). Table 5.2. presents the cost models used for
bridge component replacement costs (Rodriguez et al., 2006). Construction time was
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assumed to be related to construction cost, and travel time increase was assumed to relate
to detour length and a travel speed of 45 miles per hour.
Table 5.2. Bridge Cost Data for the Case Study
Bridge
Material
Type
Concrete
Slab
Bridges

Concrete
Beam
Bridges

Bridge
Component
Superstructure
Substructure
Approach
Other
Superstructure
Substructure
Approach
Other

Superstructure
Substructure
Approach
Other
Source: Rodriguez et al. 2006
Steel
Bridges

Component Cost Models
,¨5 = . 2598 + .066 ∗ 5($,)($,,$#
∗ !+.ªLNN ∗ )#M .§NNO
,¨! = 1.2603 ∗ !+.LLNP ∗ ,¨!« .§¦§
55 = 53.6713 + .1970 ∗ #)
X)« = .856 ∗ !+.¥UU ∗ )#M .N¥¥U
,¨5 = .0244 ∗ !+L.<ª§¥ ∗ )#M L.<PNP
,¨! = −37.848 + .023 ∗ #
55 = −772 + .563 ∗ !+ + 19.05 ∗ )#M
+ 18.71 ∗ ,¨!«
X)« = .0422 ∗ !+.PNªO ∗ )#M L.OPLN
∗ ,¨!« .¦U§§
$56.66/sq.ft.
$17.12/sq.ft.
$56.36/sq.ft.
$45.12/sq.ft.

Average Cost
($/sq.ft.)
$74.28
$250.60
N/A
$91.93
$64.55
$134.43
N/A
$0.30

Where SUPC is the total superstructure replacement cost for bridges (1,000’s 2002$); BL is the bridge
length (ft.); TDW is the total deck width (ft.); PRESTRESSED holds a value of 1 if the superstructure made
of prestressed concrete, 0 otherwise; SUBC is the total substructure replacement cost (1,000’s 2002$);
SUBH is the substructure height (ft.); APPC is the total approach replacement cost (1,000’s 2002$); ADT is
the average daily traffic; OTHC contains the costs related to traffic control, excavation, mobilization,
demobilization, and office expenses (1,000’s 2002$); and DA is the deck area (sq.ft.).

5.3. Network Level Security Rating Analysis
The security rating method was applied to each bridge in the state of Indiana at
the asset-level using the data described above. Distributions of each security factor for the
Indiana bridge network can be seen in Figures 5.1.-5.3.
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Threat Likelihood Factor Probability Distribution
Normal, Mean=5.57, StDev=1.54
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Figure 5.1. Indiana Bridge Network Level Distribution of Threat Likelihood Factor
Resilience Factor Distribution Plot
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Figure 5.2. Indiana Bridge Network Level Distribution of Resilience Factor
Consequence Factor Distribution Plot
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Figure 5.3. Indiana Bridge Network Level Distribution of Consequence Factor
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The security rating histogram of all bridges in the state of Indiana is visualized in Figure
5.4. Many of Indiana’s bridges have a low-to-medium security rating with some bridges
in the very low security rating range. The bridges with low security ratings may be of
interest to decision-makers when allocating resources.

Figure 5.4. Indiana Bridge Network Level Histogram of Security Rating

Security ratings for Indiana’s bridge network were calculated and the factors for
each bridge were graphed in different combinations (Figures 5.5-5.7.). Of the total
number of bridges in Indiana, 2.34% of the bridges have low security ratings (1.67<SR),
62.91% of the bridges have low-to-medium security ratings (1.67<SR<5.0), 30.77% of
the bridges have medium-to-high security ratings (5.0<SR<8.35), and 3.99% of Indiana
bridges have high security ratings (SR>8.35).
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Figure 5.5. Indiana Bridge Network Threat Likelihood-Resilience Nomograph

Figure 5.6. Indiana Bridge Network Consequence-Resilience Nomograph
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Figure 5.7. Indiana Bridge Network Threat Likelihood-Consequence Nomograph

As demonstrated in the figures, many of Indiana’s bridges lie in the high
importance (dark gray) regions. Further analysis was conducted by organizing the Indiana
bridge network by material type, geographic region, route type, and NHS status. To
normalize each category, the frequency of each security rating was divided by the total
number of bridges in each category. The normalized frequency numbers were presented
as percentages. For example, in Figure 5.8., there are a higher percentage of urban
bridges with a security rating of 5.0 than rural bridges. The scale in Figure 5.4. is based
on Indiana network security ratings with a mid-range rating of 5.0. If a security rating of
1.67 is the cutoff for assets that require large improvements to increase their security,
further conclusions can be made.
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Figure 5.8. Security Rating of Bridges by Geographic Region.

The percentage of rural bridges with a security rating below 1.67 is 1.42% while
urban bridges have 4.12% below this rating (Figure 5.8.). This implies that urban bridges
have increased design standards for large traffic volumes and may receive a greater
frequency of maintenance due to wear and tear. Rural bridges may have lower design
standards due to low traffic volumes and may require less frequent maintenance cycles
due to less traffic wear and tear. More frequent maintenance may increase asset
conditions over time, which contributes to higher resilience and higher security ratings.
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Figure 5.9. Security Rating of Bridges by Route Type

Interstate, U.S. route, and state route bridges had percentages of 0.55%, 2.42%, and
2.15% of their bridges below a security rating of 1.67 (Figure 5.9.). This implies that
Interstate bridges have higher design standards (e.g., thicker pavement) which play a role
in increasing security ratings while U.S. route and state route bridges have different or
less stringent design standards compared to interstate bridges. By combining
geographical location and bridge type (Figure 5.10.), 0.55% of rural interstate bridges are
below the 1.67 security rating and 5.39% of urban interstate bridges. This implies that
interstate bridges located in an urban location may have higher design standards, but the
consequences of failure are greater than in a rural location. More people are located in
urban areas to travel over the bridges and may be affected if the bridge was closed due to
increased travel times on detours and possible injuries.
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Figure 5.10. Security Rating of Interstate Bridges by Geographic Region
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Figure 5.11. Security Rating of Bridges by NHS Status

Non-NHS (National Highway System) bridges had 2.17% of bridges below a
security rating of 1.67 and NHS bridges had 2.64% below this rating (Figure 5.11.). This
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can result from higher traffic volumes on NHS roads and therefore greater consequences
from travel time increases and possible injuries if the bridge fails. Non-NHS roads may
be are locally managed and may not be held to the standards indicated for NHS
roadways, but may be less traveled. These characteristics may lead to the differences in
total percentage of bridges below the 1.67 security rating threshold.
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Figure 5.12. Security Rating of Bridges by Material Type

Steel, concrete, and pre-stressed concrete bridges had 3.73%, 0.69%, and 1.55%
of their total bridges below the 1.67 security rating. This implies that concrete bridges
may be more secure than steel bridges, but could be due to geographic location. Steel
bridges may be located in more urban areas while concrete bridges could be located in
rural areas. Additionally, different bridge types may have been preferred over others in
past construction practices therefore leading to the differences. These characteristics
could play a role in influencing the security ratings of these bridges.
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5.3.1. Spatial Analysis
Further modeling techniques should be conducted to examine the security rating
and infrastructure characteristics interaction through GIS ArcMap 10.1 for spatial
analysis. As seen in Figure 5.13., many bridges around Indianapolis, Indiana have a low
security rating. Indianapolis is in an urban location with a high population density. Many
bridges leading into the city are highly traveled and, if closed, can cause large traffic
delays. Therefore, these characteristics can play a large role in the low security ratings of
these bridges. Additionally, many bridges located in the outer perimeter of Indianapolis
have a higher security rating, implying that these bridges may be less traveled and located
outside the urban area. From an agency perspective, spatial analysis provides the means
to pinpoint low security areas where improvements should be focused. Spatial analysis
would help identify areas of high consequences in the case that a bridge did fail. In
Figure 5.13., this area is located in the heart of the city.
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Figure 5.13. Visualization of Indianapolis Bridges using Security Rating

5.4. Chapter Summary
By analyzing transportation infrastructure from a network-level perspective,
specific infrastructure types with low security ratings are identified. The characteristics
that lead to low security ratings are able to be cataloged for future reference. Spatial
analysis further enables agencies and stakeholders to visualize areas of concern and work
to secure the infrastructure in those locations. This case study is an example of analyzing
infrastructure at the network level based solely on security. Chapter 6 further describes
how uncertainty is incorporated into the security rating framework.
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CHAPTER 6: INCORPORATION OF UNCERTAINTY IN INFRASTRUCTURE
SECURITY ASSESSMENT

6.1. Introduction
In view of their inherently dynamic and highly unpredictable nature, threat
likelihood, infrastructure resilience, and consequence are difficult to determine with
certainty. Due to this problem, this chapter enhances the basic framework presented in
the previous chapter using fuzzy logic techniques. The method is particularly useful when
data is unavailable or imprecise, allowing the security rating to be determined using a
qualitative expert-assigned level with each factor contributing to overall security. The
evaluation of the security factors are represented as fuzzy triangular numbers with
accompanying membership rules that define the extent of contribution by each factor to
overall infrastructure security. Then, using a case study, the chapter applies the fuzzybased methodology to illustrate how uncertainty considerations could be included in
determining the overall security of specific infrastructure.

6.2. Uncertainty
Uncertainty causes encompass a wide range including: lack of information, an
abundance of information (complexity), conflicting evidence, ambiguity, measurement,
etc. Uncertainty due to ambiguity includes (i) physical randomness, (ii) statistical
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uncertainty due to limited information in estimation and the characteristics of these
variables, and (iii) model uncertainty due to simplifying assumptions in analytical
models, predicative models, simplified methods, and idealized representations of real
performances (Ayyub and Gupta, 1997). Uncertainty due to vagueness is caused by (i)
variable definitions, (ii) human error and factors, and (iii) defining interrelationships
among problems variables (Ayyub, 1992). Information can also vary from set numerical
data to rough linguistic opinion, which in turn determines the quality and quantity of
available data. In this dissertation, uncertainty is defined as “a human-related subjective
notion which depends on the quantity and quality of information which is available to a
decision-maker about a system of its behavior that the decision-maker wants to describe,
predict, or prescribe.” This is the same manner in which uncertainty is identified by
Ayyub and Gupta (1997).
Threat likelihood is very uncertain due to the nature of natural and man-made
threats. It is difficult to predict with certainty the exact moment transportation
infrastructure is likely to fail due to the complexity of both internal and outside forces.
For example, a bridge may be located near an earthquake fault, but it may have been
dormant for many years. In this instance, a sudden catastrophic tremor may occur
seemingly without warning. Similarly, if infrastructure is built with faulty material or a
design flaw, the infrastructure may not be affected until the component fails, often
without notice. Accidents and threats of both natural and man-made variety cannot be
predicted with 100% accuracy due to their inherently uncertain nature.
Consequences are also highly variable and not easily predicted. For example, a
component of a bridge may fail, but the bridge may still appear to be structurally sound
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before the problem is found. In another case, an important component failing may lead
the entire bridge to succumb. Additionally, the consequences due to a bridge closure may
affect users and agencies differently. A user may have increased travel time due to rerouting to another bridge to get across a river, while an agency would need to find
additional funds to repair a damaged bridge. The uncertain nature of infrastructure
damage and its consequences lead to ambiguity in predicting them.
Resilience is also uncertain in nature because infrastructure can be designed and
built to be resilient, but a mistake in the drawings or construction can lead to failure
during a threat occurrence. Uncertainty must be accounted for when security of
infrastructure is being explored.

6.3. Fuzzy Logic Framework
As previously stated, the security of an infrastructure is a function of three main
factors: (1) the threat likelihood, (2) infrastructure resilience, and (3) consequence. The
security rating metric developed in Chapter 3 combines these factors. This chapter duly
accommodates the fact that all three factors are characterized by a significant degree of
uncertainty; and therefore, introduces fuzziness in the levels of these factors and in their
outcome (e.g., the security rating). The enhancements to this method will allow experts to
use the security rating method in situations where they are faced with imprecise or
inadequate data.
A fuzzy logic framework for fuzzification of the security-related measures and
attributes is particularly useful when decision makers lack access to infrastructure-
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specific information for each factor. The framework inputs fuzzy data into the security
rating equation to yield a fuzzy output. The Matlab Fuzzy Toolbox (MathWorks, 2013)
was used to program this framework. For example, each factor can be fuzzified to output
a level of that specific factor as seen for the threat likelihood factor (Figure 6.2.)
(Dojutrek, et al, 2014). Each measure has a “degree of membership” ranging from low to
high on a pre-specified scale. The value of the factor depends on the level of each
measure, and the measure levels are in turn determined by their respective consistent
attributes. The value of each fuzzified factor is then input into the overall security rating
fuzzy-based analysis that yields a fuzzy security rating for a specific infrastructure
(Figure 6.1.).

(a) Threat Likelihood Factor
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(b) Resilience Factor

(c) Consequence Factor
Figure 6.1. Fuzzy Logic Models for the Factors of Infrastructure Security Rating.
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(a) Threat Likelihood Membership Functions

(b) Fuzzy Threat Likelihood Model
Figure 6.2. Fuzzy Threat Likelihood Factor and Attributes.
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Figure 6.3. Fuzzy Security Rating.

6.4. Rules
Fuzzy rules were developed to determine the fuzzy security rating output for the
fuzzy logic system. The rules give mathematical meaning to the different linguistic levels
of each factor in the security rating framework (Figure 6.4.). Thus, a complete fuzzy
inference system is created. Fuzzy membership functions for the security rating are
shown in Figure 6.4.
Rules:
If resilience is high, consequence is low, and threat likelihood is low, then SR is high.
If resilience is high, consequence is high, and threat likelihood is high, then SR is
medium.
If resilience is high, consequence is medium, and threat likelihood is medium, then SR is
medium.
If resilience is medium, consequence is medium, and threat likelihood is medium, then
SR is medium.
If resilience is medium, consequence is low, and threat likelihood is low, then SR is
medium.
If resilience is medium, consequence is high, and threat likelihood is high, then SR is
low.
If resilience is low, consequence is medium, and threat likelihood is medium, then SR is
low.
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If resilience is low, consequence is high, and threat likelihood is high, then SR is low.
If resilience is low, consequence is low, and threat likelihood is low, then SR is medium.
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Consequence
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Threat Likelihood
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Consequence
L
M
H
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Consequence
L
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Resilience Medium
High

Low SR

Medium SR

High SR

Figure 6.4. Visualization of Fuzzy Rules.

Figure 6.5. Fuzzy Membership Functions.

6.5. Case Study for Fuzzy Security Rating
To demonstrate the framework developed for fuzzifying the security ratio, the Leo
Figo Memorial Bridge in Green Bay, Wisconsin, National Bridge Inventory (NBI)
structure number B05015800100000, was used (Figure 6.6.). Data was collected from the
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National Bridge Inventory (FHWAb, 2014). The factors, measures, and attributes used
for the case study are described in Figure 6.7.

Figure 6.6. Leo Frigo Memorial Bridge, Green Bay, Wisconsin.

Figure 6.7. Detailed Framework for Case Study (Dojutrek et al, 2014).
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A number of assumptions were made for this case study. First, the construction
time (days) was based on the bridge size (ft2). Second, environmental barriers were
assumed to be the waterway under the bridge. The detour travel speed was assumed to be
45mph, and all weights in the security rating equation (α, δ, λ) and measures equation
were assumed to be equal. Threat likelihood measures, attributes, and scales can be seen
in Table 6.1. This data was taken from the NBI database. The result of each measure is
the scaled attributes multiplied together and normalized by the number of attributes for
each measure, and then subsequently multiplied by the measure’s weight. An uncertaintybased expression of the degree of the threat likelihood, asset resilience, and consequence
is established after these results are analyzed. The fuzzy degree of threat likelihood is 1.6,
the fuzzy degree of resilience is 5.0, and the fuzzy degree of consequence is 1.78.
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Table 6.1. LFM Bridge Factor Data.
Threat Likelihood
Access to Asset

Location Specific
Hazards

Environmental Barriers

Over Fox River

3

Physical Barriers

Independent bridge protection

2

Natural Hazards

High winds, fog

4

County Freeze Index

189.3

2

County Precipitation

29.52

1

3

2.66

Resilience
Resistance

Recoverability

Asset Characteristics

Condition

Deck: 8

5

Superstructure: 7

5

Substructure: 6

4

Age

35 yrs

2

Const. Time

3yrs

3

Const. Cost

$6.85M

3

Asset Size

39,115 ft2

3

Material

Steel

4

Design Type

Thru-Arch

1

50

9

2

Consequence
Potentially Exposed
Population

Property Loss

Mission Disruption

Population

Green Bay: 104,868
Brown County: 253,032

4

AADT

31,400

3

Replacement Cost

$6.92M

3

EDMC Value

$4.34M

2

Detour Length (miles)

~6 miles

2

Inc. in travel time due
to detour

8 min

4

6

3

4

The fuzzy degree of each security factor, (threat likelihood, resilience, and consequence),
are input into the fuzzy security rating framework (Figure 6.8.), which results in an
overall fuzzy security rating of 5.84 for the Leo Frigo Memorial Bridge. This rating
corresponds to a security rating of “medium” as shown in Figure 6.5.
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Figure 6.8. Overall Fuzzy Security Rating.

6.6. Monte Carlo Simulation
A technique is needed to examine how variations in the security factors for a
specific infrastructure influence the resulting security rating, given a normal distribution
of each factor based on the average and standard deviation of all the security factors. For
this, the Monte Carlo simulation was used. The Monte Carlo simulation is a
computerized mathematical technique that allows people to account for variability in
their process to enhance quantitative analysis and decision making (Palisade Co., 2014).
The simulation works by analyzing models of a range of possible values and results
(probability distributions) for any factor that has inherent uncertainty. The simulation
establishes the outcome of thousands of scenarios each using a different set of random
values from the probability distributions. The results of the Monte Carlo simulation are
the distributions of possible outcome values. A Monte Carlo simulation has a number of
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advantages over deterministic analysis including: probabilistic results (what could happen
and how likely each outcome is), graphical results; sensitivity analysis, scenario analysis
(see which inputs had which values together when certain outcomes occurred), and
correlation of inputs.
Figure 6.9. gives a visual representation of the Monte Carlo simulation procedure
for the security rating. The probability distributions shown in the figure are only for
illustration. Figure 6.10 was developed for the actual distributions. A total of 5,000
iterations were run for the simulation where the mean and standard deviation of the
starting parameters (threat likelihood, resilience, and consequence) were derived from the
Indiana NBI bridge database. Table 6.2. presents the statistics associated with the Monte
Carlo simulation.

Figure 6.9. Monte Carlo Simulation of Security Rating.
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Threat Likelihood Factor Probability Distribution
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(c) Threat Likelihood Factor
Figure 6.10. Distributions of Security Factors.

Table 6.2. Monte Carlo Simulation Probabilistic Security Rating
Statistics
Total Simulation Runs
Sample Mean
Median
Sample Standard Deviation
Quartile (.75), Quartile (.25)
Skewness
Kurtosis
Inter-quartile Range
Standard Error
95% Upper, Lower Confidence Level
95% Central Interval Limits

Bridge
5,000
5.653
4.808
3.477
7.117, 3.326
2.09
8.10
3.791
0.049
5.749, 5.557
1.522, 14.545

Kurtosis captures the steep or gradual slope of a distribution compared to the
normal distribution. A positive kurtosis describes a relatively steep distribution. Negative
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kurtosis indicates a relatively flat distribution. Skewness captures the degree of
asymmetry of a distribution surrounding its mean. Positive skewness indicates that the
tail of a distribution is asymmetric toward the positive values. Negative skewness
indicates that the tail of a distribution is asymmetric toward the negative values. The
mean security rating from the simulation is 5.653, indicating a “medium” security rating.
The positive kurtosis indicates the distribution is relatively peaked at the mean; and the
positive skewness indicates the tails of the distribution are asymmetrical, leaning towards
higher security ratings. The quartile ranges indicate that most security ratings for the
simulation are in the “medium” range for this bridge.

6.7. Chapter Summary and Discussion
Previous literature did not adequately consider the uncertain nature of threat
likelihood, infrastructure resilience, and consequences in the event of threat occurrence.
The information was largely qualitative in several other methodologies. A method that
can transform such qualitative information into a quantitative form would be useful in
overall security and ultimately in prioritizing infrastructure for transportation investment
evaluation or security funding allocation.
This chapter first presented a framework to quantify the three factors of security
using fuzzy logic. Each security factor was fuzzified using “high,” “medium,” and “low”
levels of its respective measures and membership functions. The factors were input into
the framework that provides the fuzzy security rating for specific infrastructure. A fuzzy
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system captures the dynamic and uncertain nature of each security factor by creating a
fuzzy set of numbers for each level of membership.
The Leo Frigo Memorial Bridge in Green Bay, Wisconsin was used as a case
study for the fuzzy-based framework. Data was taken from the United States National
Bridge Inventory database to use as an example for determining security measure levels
and membership functions for each security factor. All the attribute values were scaled,
and the respective measures fuzzified for input into the overall fuzzy security rating
framework. The Leo Frigo Memorial Bridge was found to have a security rating of 5.84
which can be considered “medium.” The case study illustrated how the fuzzy security
rating can account for the uncertain nature of the security-related data.
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CHAPTER 7: USING SECURITY RATING IN INVESTMENT EVALUATION OR
PRIORITIZATION

7.1. Introduction
Security is a performance criteria associated with little observable return on
investment. This makes it difficult to balance security costs with other more traditional
transportation agency initiatives such as economic efficiency, travel time, and/or safety
(SAIC & PB Consult, 2009). Security initiatives must be well defined in order to
successfully compete with other performance measures in the context of multi-criteria
decision-making. This chapter creates a case for including security as a stand-alone
performance measure and prioritizing projects based on their individual contributions to
security improvement. Increase in security due to alternative improvements has the
potential to influence decisions in a multi-criteria evaluation process.

7.2. Security Rating as a Performance Measure
Many considerations must be addressed when choosing evaluation criteria for
security investments. In terms of security, effectiveness (benefits) can be captured in the
resilience term. A highly resilient infrastructure will withstand damage from a hazard and
reduce the consequences associated with total destruction of the asset. Security costs
include the consequences due to infrastructure damage from a threat. Examples include
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both agency costs (damage costs and repair costs) and user costs (travel time increase and
detours). The impact on security due to an alternative improvement can be captured
through the security rating. The cost effectiveness of an alternative investment can be
measured in terms of the increase to the security rating or the security rating of an asset
after implementation of the investment project. Figure 7.1. provides a depiction of the
change in security rating over time for a given asset. When the asset is first constructed,
the security rating is most likely to be high due to the fact that new construction more
frequently adheres to modern building standards. Throughout the asset lifecycle, the
security rating will decrease due to increased usage, general wear and tear, and ageing of
the physical infrastructure (e.g., increased travel demand, environmental impacts, or
obsolete building standards). The existing security rating (ESR) for an asset at any time t,
would reflect these gradual changes. When an improvement is performed, the security
rating should increase promptly which can be measured as a final security rating (FSR).
For example, an improvement to rehabilitate a bridge would provide current design
standards for the construction, thereby improving the bridge’s physical structure and
resilience. This change in security rating offers another measure of effectiveness for an
improvement alternative.
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Figure 7.1. Conceptual Changes in Security Rating over Time

7.3. Using Security Rating in Prioritizing Transportation Security Investments Only
To incorporate the security rating into a multi-criteria evaluation as a performance
measure, the ESR is used in order to capture the current state of an asset as a generic
performance measure without the influence of an alternative (Table 7.1.). The increase in
security rating (ISR) is an alternative-specific measure that captures the alternative’s
influence on the security of an asset (Table 7.2.). The FSR is another alternative-specific
measure that provides an interaction measure between an asset’s current security rating
and the effects the improvement would cause (Table 7.3.). The ESR allows the decisionmaker to prioritize assets based on their current security rating without the influence of
improvement benefits. This evaluation is useful to determine which assets have the
greatest need for security improvements at the current time. The ESR does not indicate
the overall effects of an improvement to a transportation infrastructure network. This
evaluation method should be used for asset-level prioritization. The ISR evaluation
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method allows a decision-maker to determine the extent an improvement may influence
the security of an asset. This method may be misleading if only alternatives with large
security increases are considered. The alternatives with small security increases should
not be ruled out solely due to this method. The FSR provides the decision-maker with the
security rating of an asset after an improvement is completed. This method is useful to
determine the overall security improvement to a transportation network. The drawback of
this method is that greater consideration is given to assets that start with a high security
rating where an improvement could only increase security further. Assets with lower
security ratings increase in security but generally would not overcome those that started
with large security ratings with this method. Each of these methods is useful in
prioritizing security improvement alternatives based on the specific objective of interest
to decision-makers.

Table 7.1. Simple Example of Existing Security Rating Prioritization
Asset

Existing Security Rating (ESR)

Asset 1
Asset 2
Asset 3

3.22
2.45
5.65

Priority Rank on the Basis of Existing Security
Rating
3
1
4

Asset 4
Asset 5
Asset 6

7.40
8.18
3.12

5
6
2

The ESR prioritization indicates that assets with low initial security ratings should
be placed at a higher priority level for improvements. In the example in Table 7.1., Asset
2 has the lowest security rating and would be given priority for further improvements.
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Table 7.2. Simple Example of Increase in Security Rating Prioritization

1

Asset

Improvement

ESR1

ISR1
(∆SR)

Rank using
ESR

Rank using
ISR

Asset 1
Asset 2
Asset 3
Asset 4
Asset 5

Bridge Superstructure Reinforcement
Bridge Pier Improvement
Bridge Rehabilitation
Bridge Guardrail Replacement
Bridge Deck Repair

3.22
2.45
5.65
7.40
8.18

4.57
3.00
4.00
0.52
1.32

3

2
4
3
6
5

Asset 6

Bridge Substructure Reinforcement

3.12

4.88

1
4
5
6
2

1

ESR: Existing Security Rating; ISR: Increase in Security Rating

The ISR prioritization indicates that the asset with the greatest associated
improvement and, therefore, increase in security is given the highest priority. In the
example in Table 7.2., Asset 6 would be given priority due to its relatively high increase
in security. This example illustrates the drawback of only considering the increase in
security, as opposed to focusing on the low ESR of Asset 2.
Table 7.3. Simple Example of Final Security Rating Prioritization

1

Asset

Improvement

ESR1

ISR1
(∆SR)

FSR1
(SR + ∆SR)

Rank
using
ESR

Rank
using
ISR

Asset 1

Bridge Superstructure Reinforcement

3.22

4.57

7.79

3

2

Rank
using
FSR
5

Asset 2

Bridge Pier Improvement

2.45

3.00

5.45

1

4

6

Asset 3
Asset 4
Asset 5

Bridge Rehabilitation
Bridge Guardrail Replacement
Bridge Deck Repair

5.65
7.40
8.18

4.00
0.52
1.32

9.65
7.92
9.50

4
5
6

3
6
5

1
4
2

Asset 6

Bridge Substructure Reinforcement

3.12

4.88

8.00

2

1

3

ESR: Existing Security Rating; ISR: Increase in Security Rating; FSR: Final Security Rating

The asset and alternative with the greatest security rating after an improvement is
given the highest priority. In the example in Table 7.3., Asset 3 would be given highest
priority. This example illustrates how this method could be misleading since the asset
with the lowest ESR is prioritized last.
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7.4. Using Security Rating in Evaluating Alternative Transportation Investments
The concept of security should be incorporated into multi-criteria evaluation by
including security as one of the several performance measures already in use to evaluate
transportation infrastructure investments. Traditionally, the performance measures used
in project evaluation include:
•

Air quality

•

Noise

•

Economic Efficiency

•

Economic Development

•

Travel Time

•

Safety

•

Vehicle Operating Costs (VOC)

•

Connectivity
The prioritization of transportation assets typically utilizes performance measures

related to asset characteristics, operations, and the surrounding environment. These
criteria generally do not consider asset security, which is a function of the threat
likelihood/magnitude, resilience of the transportation asset, and the resulting
consequences of a potential threat. This implies that assets with low security do not
receive the consideration they deserve during project evaluation and prioritization.
It is feasible to add security as one of these criteria in transportation investment
evaluation, prioritization, and decision making. The addition of a security performance
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measure would increase the pool of available projects from which to select from when
performing multi-criteria evaluation of alternative projects (Figure 7.2.).

Figure 7.2. Multiple-Criteria Nature of Highway Investment Impacts

Secondly, the effectiveness of each alternative, regardless of type, can be converted into
terms of security. The evaluation benefits can capture how well an improvement
increases resilience and decreases potential consequences. Alternative evaluation is then
performed based on the amount each alternative influences the security of an asset
(Figure 7.3.). The security rating is useful to normalize the benefits of project
alternatives, and should be considered a key performance measure in multi-criteria
evaluation.
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Figure 7.3. Importance of Security in Investment Evaluation

7.5. Chapter Summary
The evaluation of transportation assets typically utilizes performance measures
related to asset characteristics, operations, and the surrounding environment. These
evaluation methods generally do not consider asset security. This chapter provides a case
for utilizing security as a performance measure by presenting example project
alternatives prioritized by existing security ratings, increases in security ratings due to
improvements, and the final security ratings after an improvement. The chapter further
identified how security improvement projects should be included in a candidate project
alternative pool and how each alternative in the pool can be prioritized based on their
contribution to asset security. Security is a viable performance measure among the
current performance measures identified for transportation project decision-making. The
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next chapter provides a summary and discussion of the overall framework developed in
this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

8.1. Summary and Discussion
The first part of this dissertation provides an overview of the importance of
transportation to society, the potential consequences that affect transportation services,
current transportation security measures, and an overview of literature pertaining to
different security methodologies. Many of the reviewed methods utilize a risk equation
that identifies three main factors which, combined, provide a measure of risk. The first
factor is the likelihood of threat, the second is the vulnerability of an asset due to a threat,
and the third is consequences resulting should the asset become damaged or fail. Threat
refers to any unexpected natural, unintentional man-made, or intentional man-made event
that causes damage or disruption. Threat likelihood pertains to the probability of a threat
occurring, either natural or man-made, that could cause the damage and/failure of the
infrastructure being assessed. Consequence is defined as the collective costs and
associated losses of damaged or destroyed infrastructure due to a threat. This dissertation
provides an argument to retain the threat likelihood and consequence factors within the
risk equation, while replacing the third factor with the concept of resilience. Resilience is
a function of vulnerability, defined as the ability of infrastructure to resist and recover
from a threat. Resilience captures the concept of vulnerability by accounting for the
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weaknesses inherent in infrastructure that have the potential to fail. More specifically, in
this dissertation, resilience is defined as the ability of infrastructure to withstand a
potential threat.
The second part of the dissertation presents a framework for quantifying the
security of transportation infrastructure based on three factors: threat likelihood,
consequences of threats, and infrastructure resilience. The three factors are weighted and
mathematically combined to provide a quantitative security rating for a transportation
asset. Within each factor, a series of measures were identified in order to capture the
performance of infrastructure in terms of resilience, threat likelihood, and potential
consequences due to damage or failure. Furthermore, the measures are divided into
attributes that incorporate a specific level of contribution, rated on a scale, to define the
overall amount that each measure contributes to a specific security factor. The attributes
are scaled so that they normalize distinct measurement units in order to be included into
the security rating framework.
The John F. Kennedy Bridge in Jeffersonville, Indiana was identified as the assetlevel case study to apply this security rating methodology. The security rating of the the
John F. Kennedy Bridge was 1.31. This security rating, on a scale of zero to ten, is a
relatively low rating and necessitates improvements. A network level case study was
carried out for the bridge network in Indiana. The methodology determined that 2.34% of
Indiana bridges have low security ratings (1.67<SR), 62.91% have low-to-medium
security ratings (1.67<SR<5.0), 30.77% have medium-to-high security ratings
(5.0<SR<8.35), and 3.99% of Indiana bridges have high security ratings (SR>8.35).
Bridges in Indiana were grouped by material type, geographic region, roadway type, and

127
NHS status for further security analysis. The percentage of rural bridges with a security
rating below 1.67 is 1.42%, while urban bridges have 4.12% below this rating. Interstate,
U.S. route, and state route bridges had 0.55%, 2.42%, and 2.15% of their bridges below a
security rating of 1.67 respectively. Non-NHS (National Highway System) bridges have
2.17% of their bridges below a security rating of 1.67, and NHS bridges have 2.64% of
their bridges below this same rating. Steel, concrete, and pre-stressed concrete bridges
had 3.73%, 0.69%, and 1.55% of their total bridges below the 0.4 security rating
respectively. Additionally, bridges of concern could be spatially identified using ArcGIS
and the security rating to determine areas of focus. Based on the network-level case
study, the methodology would provide decision-makers with the ability to analyze
transportation infrastructure at both the asset and network-level for security purposes.
In order to incorporate uncertainty, a fuzzy security rating was developed and a
Monte Carlo simulation was run. A fuzzy security rating would allow for stochastic
security factors to account for missing data or unknown measures. This method relies on
expert opinion to determine the extent each factor affects overall security of an asset. In
this case, each factor has a “high,” “medium,” or “low” level which determines the fuzzy
security rating based on defined rules. As mentioned in Chapter 6, an example of a fuzzy
rule is: If resilience is high, consequence is low, and threat likelihood is low then the
Security Rating is high. Additionally, fuzzification of each measure and associated
attributes can account for more uncertainty. A case study using the fuzzy security rating
framework was performed for the Leo Frigo Memorial Bridge in Green Bay, Wisconsin.
The fuzzy security rating of this bridge was 5.84, equating to a “medium” level of
security. A Monte Carlo simulation was run to provide an average output for a bridge
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given a probability distribution for each security factor. The mean sample security rating
was 5.65, a medium rating indicating some improvements may be needed for security
purposes.
Finally, a case was made to include security in multi-criteria evaluation.
Prioritizing security investments and including security in the plethora of criteria for
evaluation was explored. Decision-makers would be able to use the security rating
framework to identify infrastructure in need of improvement based on the asset’s current
security rating, an increase in security rating due to a potential improvement, and a final
security rating of an asset after an improvement was completed. Security as a
performance measure for all project types would enable decisions to be made based on
the alternative’s contribution to asset security.

8.2. Future Improvements
This dissertation provides a framework for quantifying security in terms of asset
resilience, threat likelihood, and consequences due to threats. The methodology it
outlines has the potential to be utilized in fields outside of transportation in order to
provide security ratings for varying types of infrastructure. In this case, new experts must
be consulted to develop specific rating scales as well as to provide weights to each
individual security measure and factor. The scales in this dissertation, however, are linear
in nature and should be enhanced through non-linear models. Future work in this area
would provide a security rating scale based on the new attribute scales and specifically
identified measures of importance.
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Optimization models already in practice should be run with the inclusion of the
security rating performance measure, and any variations to the final output should be
analyzed. Interaction effects between performance measures could be analyzed in a
separate model. Conversion of project alternatives from various transportation
improvement systems (e.g., pavement management system, safety management system,
and congestion management system) should be measured in terms of security and input
into the optimization model. This optimization model would be able to determine the
benefits of making alternative decisions with the context of security.

8.3. Conclusion

The risk methodologies reviewed in the literature tend to provide differing
definitions for similar security factors and combine these factors in a myriad of
techniques. These methods rely on the current risk equation which relates the factors of
threat likelihood, vulnerability, and consequence. The proposed security rating
framework improves this equation by including the factor of resilience. Resilience is
defined as the ability of infrastructure to withstand threats. With these three factors, a
framework was developed to provide decision-makers with a method to quantify security
for transportation infrastructure. The framework outlines the measures and attributes
associated with each factor that contribute to security. The framework was fuzzified and a
Monte Carlo simulation was run to account for uncertainty within the method. Threats are
highly non-deterministic, therefore it is beneficial to include a probability distribution and
range of factor levels in the framework. This helps to provide a range of potential security
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outcomes. Finally, security should be considered as a performance measure within
transportation project evaluation itself. Decision-makers would then gain the ability to
prioritize infrastructure improvements based on their security contribution, by including
security as one of the many performance measures in multi-criteria evaluation. Security
of transportation infrastructure is integral to keep people and goods moving throughout
the world. The transportation sector provides millions of employment opportunities and
greatly contributes to the gross domestic economy of the United States. Without
transportation, most activities would come to a standstill and lead to an immense
economic decline. Protection of transportation infrastructure is of the utmost importance
in order to maintain the quality of life needed for a country to run, and continue to run,
efficiently.
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